

AUG 6 1943

Anglican Theological Review



EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

FOUNDED BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

VOLUME XXV

JULY, 1943

NUMBER 3

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PUBLISHED BY

ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

600 HAVEN STREET
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

PRINCE AND LEMON STS.
LANCASTER, PENNSYLVANIA

\$1.00 A NUMBER

\$3.00 A YEAR

Anglican Theological Review

VOLUME XXV

JULY, 1943

NUMBER 3

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The REVIEW is published four times a year, as follows: Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn numbers. Subscription price \$3.00 annually. Single copies, \$1.00.

All editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor, the Rev. Frederick C. Grant, 3041 Broadway, New York City.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Treasurer, the Rev. Percy V. Norwood, 600 Haven Street, Evanston, Illinois.

Books for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor, the Rev. S. E. Johnson, 6 Phillips Place, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Entered as second-class matter, August 8, 1931, at the post-office at Evanston, Illinois, under the act of March 3, 1879; with additional entry at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

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WILLIAM TEMPLE

By JOHN C. BENNETT

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New York City

On a recent visit to one of the Japanese relocation centers I entered the barracks of a young Japanese Methodist minister, a citizen of Japan who had been in this country for only a few years. On the wall there was a picture of William Temple. It seemed to me that to find his picture there was a symbol of the way in which his influence has broken through barriers. Who could be more remote from those barracks than the Archbishop of Canterbury, usually a symbol of Anglo-Saxon respectability, whatever the character of the individual Archbishop? In this paper I hope to show why this Archbishop of Canterbury is admired and loved in unexpected places around the world.

There is no doubt that the recent elevation of William Temple to the see of Canterbury is evidence that a change is really coming over the social and economic life of England. It has been suggested by observers who should know the facts that Temple would never have been chosen Archbishop in a free election on the part of the clergy of the Church of England. Whether or not that is true I do not know. It may be that there are still enough of the kind of clergy described by

** Author's note:* It should be explained that this article was first written as a paper to be read to a group that was for the most part acquainted with Archbishop Temple only through the newspapers. The only point in publishing it in such a journal as this is that it does represent a non-Anglican view of Temple. A few of the paragraphs appeared in *The Seminar Quarterly*, a Congregational publication. I am grateful to its editor for permission to use that material in this article.

Anthony Trollope to come out of their retirement and vote for a safer man. But if another man had been chosen it would have been in the face of the fact that William Temple is generally acknowledged as the spiritual leader of the Church of England and indeed as the greatest figure in non-Roman Christendom.

William Temple receives publicity for everything except the thing that he is most concerned about—personal religion. He does not parade his piety. In fact he is probably as good an example as one could find of what William James called "healthy-mindedness" in religion. He believes passionately that the center of all Christian living is worship but he believes as passionately that worship is never to be separated from the rest of life. He has said about the preference of so many modern philosophers for the study of mystical states which they regard as the quintessence of religion: "St. Paul had wonderful 'experiences'; but he declared that the only test of their divine character was to be found in their power or impotence to increase charity. So Saint John said, with excellent terseness: 'If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar.'"¹

Temple's major intellectual interest in early life was philosophy. He must have been rather precocious because he struggled through Kant's *The Critique of Pure Reason* and *The Metaphysic of Morals* during the summer when he was seventeen. He lectured on philosophy for three years at Oxford. He is deeply versed in classical thought. Plato and Aristotle have formed his mind almost as much as the Bible and theology. Most of his more ambitious books are on the borderline between philosophy and theology. The two most ambitious are his *Mens Creatrix* and *Nature, Man and God*. The latter is the publication of his Gifford Lectures which, if not among the most original so far as the structure of the thought is concerned, are at least among the richest of the many series of Gifford Lectures. They were written in the midst of a life of very heavy administrative responsibilities while he was Archbishop of York. He says in the introduction that he had had to do most of his thinking while walking or sleeping. Perhaps I should add that this is a book of some five hundred pages which does not deal, except by way of occasional illustration, with any of the topics which have given him his journalistic fame.

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 425-26.

A word should be said about the personality of the man. He is one of the most buoyant, successful, and at the same time one of the most humble men of whom I have known. He seems to have time for everyone and for every cause that commands his approval. In this respect he resembles Mrs. Roosevelt! The only serious criticism of him that I have heard, apart from disagreement with his ideas, is that he is so generous that he is a poor judge of men. He impresses one as a man who has never suffered very much either from inner conflicts or from any serious failures or misfortunes and yet he has the kind of imagination which enables him to understand the sufferings of others. It would be difficult to have a life of more unbroken success than his has been. Though he has been ahead of his time, he has never been without a following strong enough to keep him from suffering for his convictions. His father, Archbishop Frederick Temple, a more cautious man, suffered more for his convictions. The extraordinary wholeness that characterizes the man is one of the secrets of his power. He has been a favorite with the youth of the nation and they have been favorites of his. His concern for social justice which is now so much to the fore has always been close to the center of his interest. As early as 1908 he was made the first president of the Workers' Educational Association and he remained in this position for sixteen years. Until Temple was made Bishop of Manchester in 1921 he was a member of the Labor Party. He resigned at that time, not because of any change in his sympathies, but because he thought that as a Bishop he should be more detached from partisan politics. He lacks completely the air of superiority that has often characterized even very wise and good Englishmen. (Let me add that Americans have their own variety of this same trait!) In his most recent book he says: "Our snobbery as a nation is, I suppose, without parallel; it is worst in suburbia; but it is bad in most parts of society and at every level; and our educational methods tend to intensify it."²

Temple has put himself at the head of those who are trying to cleanse the Church of England of the abuses which have accumulated for centuries. He is one of the signers of a recent book entitled *Putting Our House in Order*, which calls for a complete economic reorganization of the Church of England—for, among other things, the pooling of all endowments and the equalization of the basic income of

² *Christianity and Social Order*, p. 71.

all clergy with comparatively small differentials related to need and function. Since the days when his father voted to admit Non-Conformists to the Universities and the Church yards, England has come a long way. There are now very few disabilities for Non-Conformists and a great deal of the ecclesiastical snobbery, which made the Anglican Church heartily disliked on many sides, has gone. One of the most recent signs of this important change was the report of a committee of which Archbishop Temple was Chairman in 1937 which provided in a detailed fashion for a real union of all Churches in England which conceded as much to the Non-Conformists as they conceded to the Anglicans. This report, due to the opposition of diehards in both camps, is now in a pigeonhole, but it may well prove to be an important landmark and it shows how far Archbishop Temple will go in dealing with other British Churches. I was interested to note that in his latest book he pays a great tribute to the dissenting religious bodies as schools of democracy in England. He says that since the seventeenth century the "self-government of the local Chapel has been a fruitful school of democratic procedure."³

Now I shall deal with Archbishop Temple's thought under three heads. (1) His religious philosophy. (2) His leadership in relation to the war. (3) His convictions about the reconstruction of society.

I

I have said that philosophy was Temple's first intellectual interest. He still moves with competence in the field of philosophy. In *Nature, Man and God* he develops a position, in contrast to his earlier Idealism, which he calls Dialectical Realism. This position is based upon the rejection of all forms of philosophy which share Descartes' emphasis upon the mind in separation from its objects. For Temple the primary situation is mind developing within a world of objects which are dimly perceived even before they can be said to be known. The world of objects is thus prior to all human minds and yet it is not self-sufficient as a natural order but points beyond itself to a divine mind on which it depends. The divine mind is no all-absorbing Absolute but God who is confronted by a world of his own creation, including our finite minds, as an other. The knowledge relationship is not the source of the existence of the object, and this applies to God's knowledge of us and of the world. What we have here is a decisive rejection of all

³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

subjectivism and of any form of Idealism that makes the knowledge relationship the condition of existence and of any form of Absolutism that sacrifices the finite to the infinite.

In his chapter on "The Distinction Between Natural and Revealed Theology" in *Nature, Man and God* Temple rejects the traditional separation between natural and revealed theology. He sweeps away the distinction between two kinds of data, one which belongs to the province of natural theology and the other to the province of revelation. Instead, Temple says that natural theology, or as we would now more often call it, the philosophy of religion, makes use of all of the data of experience that are relevant to the religious quest, including the data of the history of religions and also including the data of the Bible which in another context may be called "revelation." The difference between natural theology and revealed theology is to be found only in the method with which we deal with the data. In the case of natural theology the authority of the data of the Hebrew-Christian tradition is not presupposed. The Christian theologian develops the superstructure of his thought on the assumption that the Bible and especially Christ are authoritative, but his judgment that they are authoritative grows out of his previous reflection upon his experience. It is not a matter of arbitrary faith. It does depend upon faith but faith always integrated with thought that leaves nothing beyond the test of reason.

Temple is the opposite of those contemporary theologians who stress the irrational character of religious faith. He has unbounded confidence in the capacity of the humble thinker who is sensitive to facts on all levels to find a rationally coherent world view that will have Christ at its center. This at least has been his characteristic attitude. It goes with the buoyancy and wholeness of his personality. One does find some wavering on his part at the moment concerning the coherence and intelligibility of the world. In one of his books, published since the outbreak of this war, he criticizes the confidence of some of his earlier writings concerning the possibility of finding all of evil as a constituent element of the absolute good. He says wisely that before we can make that claim concerning the "monstrous evil" of war we must first eliminate it. In one rather remarkable passage he says: "We shall not try to make sense of everything; we shall openly proclaim that most things as they are have no sense in them at all."⁴ And in another place he says with refreshing honesty that we shall have to

⁴ *Thoughts in War-time*, p. 106.

postpone the day for the serener task of developing a "Christo-centric metaphysic," that "the task that claims our labour now is far less alluring to one of my temperament and upbringing," for now our concern must be "to light beacons in the darkness rather than to illuminate the world."⁵ I cannot believe that it will be long before he will again try to "make sense" of everything.

I shall now try to indicate the nature of his approach as a religious man and as a philosopher to God. He believes that careful reflection upon experience leads to the conclusion that the world cannot be adequately explained except by positing a divine mind and purpose as its ultimate source. His argument here is not one single chain of reasoning but rather several independent pointers that he finds in experience which suggest strongly that there is a divine mind. The major fact is the emergence of mind in the world process. He believes that it is incredible that our human minds should have developed out of a reality that is itself lacking in awareness, intelligence and purpose. Moreover in our day by day experience he believes that we find ourselves confronted with situations which are inadequately explained apart from a divine mind. Our sense of obligation toward truth suggests to him that truth is itself an expression of a person. Our admiration of beauty suggests that in all that is beautiful a divine mind is expressing itself. Our sense of moral obligation implies a person, beyond ourselves and beyond humanity, to which our moral choices make a difference. Temple comes back again and again in his writing to one simple affirmation which is a kind of watershed in all thinking on this subject. You either see the point of it or you do not. He says that the world process is not self-sufficient. It necessarily involves us in the quest for explanation. But, says Temple, as an explanation "the principle of personality is adequate. For it supplies . . . a ground of explanation which calls for no further explanation, thus delivering us from the infinite regress."⁶

But all of this is but the beginning. There are two essential steps in the argument which are really more important. If there is a divine person on which the world process depends, if that divine person is also the object of religious worship, we can expect that he will communicate in some fashion with men. We can expect that he will act, not merely

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶ *Nature, Man and God*, p. 262.

in his work of creation, but also in redeeming men from the sin and frustration of existence. That is only an expectation. Whether or not it is a true expectation can only be determined if we find in human history evidence of such divine activity. Temple finds such evidence in the religious history of the race. There are many degrees of this revealing activity of God. God cannot coerce men into acceptance of revelation and so for all effective revelation there must be also human appreciation of the persons and events which carry the revelation. He finds this situation in the Hebrew-Christian movement of which Christ is the center. He believes that the Christian religion has been able to absorb the truth in Judaism and also the truth in Greek insight. He believes that it can be shown that Christianity is the universal religion because every true insight that can be discovered elsewhere can also be found in Christianity in a context which is on the whole more adequate for thought and life. Central in this thought of Temple's is his belief in the special incarnation of God in Christ. Here his thought is not very distinctive. In fact the whole superstructure of his theology, while of immense importance, is rather conventional.

One characteristic of Temple's mind that should be mentioned in this context is his tolerance. Professor Sweet of the University of Chicago says of William of Orange: "His liberal spirit may be accounted for in part by his lack of interest in theology."⁷ There is doubtless a good deal of truth in the implications of that remark. But in Temple's case we can see three factors operating. The first is not lack of interest in theology but a sense of proportion in theology. Temple says of many theological beliefs which he himself shares—the belief in the Virgin Birth and the belief in the physical resurrection for example—that acceptance of these beliefs which he finds both credible and important is not necessary if one is to be a Christian. The second factor is that Temple thinks that we must accept fully one of the insights of post-Renaissance thought—it is the conviction that you cannot force ideas upon other people; they must come to see truth from their own centers and with sincerity. He says that personal sincerity is "the most fundamental human excellence," "not the highest but the most basic."⁸ To set the stage by any kind of pressure so that people find it to their interest to claim to believe more than they really do believe is fatal to this

⁷ *Religion in Colonial America*, p. 187.

⁸ *Nature, Man and God*, p. 80.

basic human virtue. It is unfortunate that Archbishops did not realize that fact some centuries ago. The third factor is suggested by these words from the introduction that he wrote to a book which seeks to formulate the doctrine that is held within the Church of England: "It is truly said that to become bitter in controversy is more heretical than to espouse with sincerity and charity the most devastating theological opinions."⁹ Sensitivity to and respect for the honest striving of the other mind and personal humility concerning the ways in which one's own mind expresses truth, are great gains.

II

Turn now to a quite different area in which Archbishop Temple has given leadership not only to the Church but to the nation. I refer to his position on the war. He has never been a pacifist. I have found in some sermons that he preached in Repton School, of which he was headmaster before the first World War, the same criticisms of pacifism which he now frequently expresses. He has come nearer to arousing bitterness against himself on the part of his own friends at times in this area than in any other. He used to say that pacifism was an example of two ancient heresies: one was Manicheanism and the other I have forgotten. But this kind of argument is not his best. In his fundamental ethical outlook he is a relativist in the sense that he believes that we are shut up to choices between evils to which the perfectionist ethics of the Sermon on the Mount cannot be applied. Rather in the spirit of love we must choose that method which will have the least evil consequences. He says in a recent pamphlet: "The whole question comes down to this: Is the Nazi threat to civilization so serious that the evil of allowing it to develop is greater even than the monstrous evil of war?"¹⁰ He has no doubt about the answer. He chooses resistance to Nazi aggression and he helps the people of England to see that they are fighting not for Christianity as such but first of all against a devastating form of injustice and second for the possibility of making civilization increasingly Christian.

But this is only one side of his guidance. Winston Churchill is not more determined to win the war than Temple. But Temple has been a leader among those who have sought to keep alive a Christian spirit dur-

⁹ *Doctrine in the Church of England*, p. 1.

¹⁰ *A Conditional Justification of War*, p. 22.

ing the war. He fully recognizes the extent to which the sins and mistakes of his own country and its allies are responsible for the conditions out of which the madness of the Nazis arose. In a broadcast to the British people on the eve of the war he said: "We must not suddenly forget all that we saw when we tried to take the standpoint of mankind as a whole. What we saw then, and our knowledge of the law and will of God, make clear to us that we, too, have contributed our share to the sin which brings this judgment upon the world. We are not worse than others in that respect; but we and they alike have failed in our history to be true to the Law and Will of God."¹¹ One form of sensitivity may be a bit puzzling to some of us. He opposes prayer for victory. He says: "I would propose it as a test of our discipleship in prayer to ask whether a patriotic German Christian could join us in our prayer."¹² He admits that it may be justifiable to pray for victory if we add "if it be thy will," but says that even that may be spiritually dangerous. Here he is guided by his deep sense of the unity of Christians across the line of battle and by his fear that men will be tempted to use God for their purposes. Lincoln shared this same sensitivity. The sensitivity is overwhelmingly right. But just how we should act upon it is a difficult problem for me. I should prefer to suggest not that any patriotic German Christian should be able to unite with me in prayer but that the prayer should be of such a character that German Christians who love Germany but see the harm that Nazism has done to Germany could enter into it. If the only things that we pray for are those which any Nazi who in one compartment of his mind is a Christian could also pray for, our prayers would become socially irrelevant.

It is considerations of this kind that have led Temple to adopt the distinction between a just and a holy war. There is a just cause at stake in this war but we must not turn it into a holy crusade, identifying our enemies with the devil. We must avoid, he believes, self-righteous hatred. If some one were to ask: If you do not hate, can you win the war? his answer would probably be words that he used in a message at Christmas in 1940 to the British people: "If we go Nazi and then win it will be the same for the world as if the Nazis won."

Temple has done a great deal to prepare the minds of people for the

¹¹ *Thoughts in War-Time*, p. 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

peace. He is, as we all know, devoted to the cause of social justice within England, but he has also committed himself resolutely to the cause of international organization. His thinking here is not distinctive. He wants to see both an inclusive League of Nations with an effective international Air Force and with real power to apply sanctions, power that overrides the sovereignty of existing states. Within this inclusive League he desires to see a gradual development of regional federations. His political thought is radically pluralistic and he hopes to see federations within federations which preserve the cultural contributions of various groups of nations.

He has done much better than most leaders in the Church in either England or America in contemplating the steps that must be taken immediately after the war. He accepts the common notion that there must be a period of five years before the real negotiations for the permanent peace settlement begin. His way of thinking about those five years is important. He believes that during that short period the German nation as a nation must be made to feel the full effect of defeat in the political realm, but in economic life and in the personal life of individual Germans those five years should be a period of gradual restoration to health. One-sided disarmament, the policing of Germany—these will be necessary; but all that is possible should be done to help Germans as people. After the five years (and I fear that he is rather optimistic in saying five years) Germany must have a place of equality in the negotiations in connection with the final settlement. Of course, no one knows just how Germany can be restored to her right mind or how long it will take, but Temple is sound in his emphasis upon the need of both firmness and magnanimity in dealing with the people of enemy nations. I think that he is also right in pointing out that it is not merely a matter of two periods, a period of firmness and a period of magnanimity but that it is also important to distinguish between the personal life of the German people and the political and military treatment of Germany as a nation during the period of firmness.

Let me summarize Temple's attitude toward the future of Germany in his own words. In the *Fortnightly* for November 1941 he wrote:

"It will be quite easy to give rein to our passions for a while and impose a vindictive peace. It will be fairly easy to be indolently generous, sinking into a selfish relaxation while talking piously about forgiving those who injure us. (But they have not injured us very much as compared with what they have done to others. I notice some people who are always repenting of their fathers' sins and forgiving Germany

the injuries done to Czechs and Poles and I am not impressed.) The course to which we are called is far harder. It is to carry the burden of securing the restored peace of Europe by disarming Germany, remaining armed ourselves, and effecting a military occupation of at least key points in Germany: but to do this without exploiting that situation to our own advantage, and steadily handing over to an international authority the control which we shall have won and exercised."

III

We turn finally to the Archbishop's views about the reconstruction of society. These have received a great deal of attention in connection with the Malvern Conference. I have said that his concern for social justice is no recent development but that as early as 1908 he was the first president of the Workers' Educational Association which put him in the center of progressive social thinking in England. He has a very interesting—and as one may think at first surprising—view of the responsibility of the Church as a Church for social reform. He does not believe that the Church as a Church should advocate any particular political or economic program. He emphasizes the fact that in every complicated social decision there are technical issues concerning which the Church as a Church is no authority. Moreover, he recognizes that on most of these issues the Church is divided and so he does not want to suggest that any particular position on these questions is a part of the gospel. However, that theory concerning the reticence of the Church as a Church seems to have no effect in restraining the Archbishop of Canterbury from speaking—presumably as William Temple, citizen, also as a member of the House of Lords—but inevitably as Archbishop. In his recent book in the Penguin series he spends most of the time stating what the Church should say and do, but then in an appendix he sets forth how he thinks the application of Christian principles might work out. He is careful to explain that his proposals are not part of the gospel, but he offers them because they give substance to the principles which the book has presented. He has been quoted as saying that it is the business of Lambeth, not to tell Westminster what to do but to remind Westminster of its duty to God. But Lambeth is likely to add a postscript with suggestions concerning how Westminster may discover the content of its duty to God.

Temple gives the following positive elements in the Church's social responsibility. First, it should bring all Christian people to see that their religion is through and through social in its implications. In

doing this it should uproot the false individualism and the false spiritualism that have corrupted most Protestant forms of Christianity. In stressing these things he would point out that concern for decent housing is a spiritual concern because of what bad housing does to persons. The same applies to the overcoming of unemployment. It is a spiritual matter because of what unemployment does to the inner lives of people. He points out that the worst evil of unemployment is not bodily hunger but the sense of social futility—the feeling that one is not wanted. That, he says, “is the thing that has power to corrupt the soul of any man not already far advanced in saintliness.”¹³

A second emphasis is that the Church must in a very clear way set forth the principles by which the social order and any proposals for changing it should be tested. He deals with these principles in two ways. In the first place there are such general principles as respect for every person as a child of God, carrying with it the implication of freedom from all forms of tyranny; right social fellowship between all groups, which carries with it responsibility to the various communities from the family to the whole of humanity; and the duty to serve which is also the right to have the kind of work in which one's life can find meaning. These by themselves are rather platitudinous but they get concreteness when they are used to test the *status quo*. The other way of thinking of principles comes from the idea of what is called natural law in much Christian theology—not the natural law of the natural sciences but the natural law of the Stoics and the Roman lawyers who found deeply imbedded in man's essential nature certain rules of life. He applies this idea of natural law to our modern economic institutions in a very provocative way. He says: “Production by its own natural law exists for consumption. If, then, a system comes into being in which production is regulated more by the profit obtainable by the producer than by the needs of the consumer, that system is defying the Natural Law or the Natural Order.”¹⁴ Now, he asks, what if such a system actually is efficient in doing the job? His answer is, first, that the present system seems now to be breaking down at the point of distribution; but secondly, and more surely, the system has failed on moral grounds because it has been the source of wrong relations between men. It has intensified the division into classes in spite of all that can be said

¹³ *Christianity and Social Order*, p. 12.

¹⁴ *Christianity and Social Order*, p. 58.

about its past efficiency, and now its efficiency is in question. These are signs that it is wrong in its structure.

So, the Church can go even this far in its presentation of principles. It can show that modern Capitalism as we know it is wrong because it subordinates consumption to production and production to the interests of those who supply the credit for production.

When the Archbishop comes to his own constructive proposals, we find that they are essentially moderate. He does not advocate Socialism as a total system because he desires to avoid too much centralization. As I have said, he is essentially pluralistic in his social thinking. I can only summarize a few of his proposals to indicate the direction of his thought:¹⁵

1. Public provision for decent housing with capital provided by the state in the case of the low cost housing so necessary for a large part of the population.

2. Family allowances for all families which have more than two children, provided by the state to supplement wages which in most cases will be provided for a family of four. I think that his first speech in the House of Lords after he became Archbishop of Canterbury was in favor of this proposal.

3. The raising of the age for compulsory education to 18 with provision for various types of vocational training combined with part time work in industry. In this connection he condemns the exclusiveness of the Public Schools. He says: "The time is ripe for a development by which it should be possible for children from every kind of home to come into any kind of school provided that they are qualified by mental, physical and personal talents." He believes that the exclusiveness of the Public Schools—his father was headmaster of Rugby and he was headmaster of Repton—is a source of divisiveness and snobbishness.

4. "Every citizen should have sufficient daily leisure, with two days of rest in seven, and if an employee, an annual holiday with pay, to enable him to enjoy a full personal life with such interests and activities as his tasks and talents may direct." The principle of holiday with pay has a very important implication that he calls attention to, and which was new to me—"it is the repudiation that an employee is an external factor hired for the hours when his labour is needed and no more."

¹⁵ These are taken rather arbitrarily from *Christianity and Social Order*.

5. In the case of all corporations—as a condition for securing limited liability—there should be a maximum rate of dividends, with provision for the use of a surplus for the maintenance of both wages and dividends in bad times.

6. Both labor and the public should be represented on all boards of directors.

7. A central planning council should be set up that would be subject to the veto of Parliament but otherwise be free to legislate on economic matters. This should represent capital, management, labor, and the consuming public.

8. The principle of the “consumer’s coöperative” should be followed in the retail distribution of goods.

9. The principle of what he calls “withering capital” should be generally applied. That is, “as soon as the interest paid on any investment is equal to the sum invested, the principal should be reduced by a specified amount each year until the claim of the investor to interest or dividends was extinguished.” This is to prevent the perpetuation of a distinct “shareholding” class in the community.

10. All banks should be owned and administered by the state or by a public corporation. The issuing of credit should not be a private function any more than the minting of money.

11. All urban land should be owned by the community, though rural land that is actually cultivated by the owner should be privately owned. Encouragement should be given to the “occupying owner” and tenancy should be allowed to decay. In general all private ownership of land should be kept under constant criticism. In his speech of September 26, he makes the suggestion that illustrates his fundamental thinking here: “I suppose if it were possible to establish a property claim upon air somebody would have done it by now and would have made people pay if they wanted to breathe what he would then call his air. So too of light.” He goes on to say that unfortunately in the case of both land and water men have established these exclusive rights of property. Now all such exclusive rights must be subordinated to the needs of the community.

What does all this come to? These eleven points as they stand may or may not all be wise in detail, but the habit of mind that lies back of them seems to me to be entirely sound. Here is a man who sees that modern economic life has developed without adequate moral

guidance during the past three hundred years, and that now we have a system that is at many points a menace to human values. He has little faith in panaceas and he sees the dangers of new systems that are designed to concentrate power in the state. He prefers to proceed by gradual reform but at all times with a radical aim. That aim is to destroy the serious inequalities of privilege, to provide real equal opportunity for all children, to give labor a greater share in the day by day control of industry, to keep economic processes in harmonious relation with political democracy, to break down barriers between classes, to keep at all times the right relation between production and the meeting of human needs. I remember once a chance remark of his that as well as anything illustrates his outlook: he said that every argument for private property is an argument for its widest possible distribution.

If he were to put in the last word, it would surely be a warning that while concern for these institutional arrangements is necessary, the health of a society depends upon the right spirit among the people. Only a people who as a whole love freedom and as a whole preserve a sense of responsibility can have a good society. And he would add, without a touch of self-righteousness, that among the people there must be many who gain their incentive for action and their understanding of life from Christian faith and Christian worship; and that the assumptions of the society which are accepted even by most of those to whom Christian faith and Christian worship have little meaning, must be assumptions controlled by Christian ethics.

DON QUIXOTE IN THE AMERICAN SCENE

By AMOS N. WILDER

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Conscientious objection to war is only one expression among many of a particular outlook on ethics that is widespread among us. Pacifism is only one phenomenon among many in a significant context. It is too simple to say that this context is that of the Christian religion. It is true that the Christian religion, like Judaism, like any true religion, bids us serve God rather than men. But this does not necessarily mean pacifism. If conscientious objection to war is to be related to the Christian outlook, it should be emphasized that it is a very particular Christian outlook, a Christian outlook strongly affected by general cultural not to say secular circumstances. What gives point to this is the fact that American idealism today produces conscientious objectors who take their stand on non-religious grounds. Those on the other hand who aver Christian motives betray the fact, under examination, that they are really dominated by the same non-religious factors in many cases. We conclude that many Christian conscientious objectors are motivated without their full knowledge by cultural influences or ideological motives that are not specifically Christian. Similarly the Egyptian eremites of the early Church or the masochist Christians among the Indians of our southwest thought their asceticism founded on their faith when it was really a carry over of pre-Christian impulses.

Indeed, our American culture has its legacies, legacies which breed new scruples and perfectionisms in every generation. Our people is obsessed with moralities, both for good and for evil. The Old Testament and the New were not bred into our bones for nothing. Every man we meet has a principle; at every turn we trip over a scruple; on every street there are banners; and in every port ships are assembling for a crusade. The nation is bound for the Kingdom of Heaven, beginning at the general store and the barber shop. It is the guarantee of our greatness but the impulses turn often to vagary and heresy.

A few years ago a picaresque novel was published with the title, *Heaven's My Destination*.¹ The discerning saw in the hero, George Brush, an attempt on the part of the author to Americanize Don Quixote, and to give him the run of Main Street in the nineteen thirties. The attempt was not so curious as may at first sight appear, for one may say that a whole migration of Don Quixotes has alighted in our latitudes during the past two decades. George Brush is a Puritan who is under a misapprehension; he is a reformer wandering about in worlds not realized. It is his fate, out of zeal, always to overshoot the mark. In the field of ethics he is always doing the wrong thing for the right reason, and the right thing for the wrong reason. He has an undigested assortment of ideas and revelations from Marx, Tolstoi, Henry George and Gandhi and an outsider's over-simplifications about the common life. He would scorn to sit down first and consult whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand. He is not satisfied to hitch his wagon to a star but he must select the most remote and cloudy of all stars, perhaps the nebula in Andromeda or some galaxy entirely invisible to the naked eye. With his hardly developed physique he boldly presses on to the inhuman higher altitudes of the Mt. Everests of the moral life, not asking himself if he has made due preparation to leave the base camp.

Our sympathies, indeed, are with Don Quixote as against his mockers, and in this case with George Brush as against the crass Babbitty of his mission field in Main Street. But one wishes that all this hardihood could be sagaciously applied. It is not that we underestimate the effectiveness of dreams or the power of martyrdom, but we note that such things count only when there is a real nexus between dream and reality, and a real collision between faith and fact. We disagree with those who say that there is no redemptive power in the muffled torture chambers of the Gestapo, that martyrdom must be public to be effective. But in the clumsy heroisms of George Brush the effects are really lost. He collides with the hard ground, not with the redoubts of evil.

Just what relation these contemporary perfectionisms have with the misconceived communal experiments and Utopianisms of the nineteenth century would make an interesting study. A certain light-headedness

¹ By Thornton Wilder; New York, 1935.

in matters ethical seems to characterize frontier phenomena in American history. George Seldes in his book, *The Stammering Century*, has assigned these curiosities to the demoralizing after-effects of the Great Awakening and the Revivals. Jonathan Edwards, descending on his time "like a dislocation of nature," and the revivalists, terrorized the consciences of our uprooted population, already beset by hardships and insecurity, and in their wrestling with the frontier ill-equipped to test the spirits. A psychologist might, indeed, put his finger significantly on the guilt obsessions of a people nurtured in a Calvinism gone to seed. Biblical literalism plus a tormented conscience is a dangerous combination, and men sought relief and compensation in curious forms, all the way from the eugenics experiment of the learned John Humphrey Noyes to the visions and hallucinations of the farmer-prophets. Even the cultured transcendentalists and their ventures would repay psychological scrutiny. Bronson Alcott was accused of proposing to nourish his disciples on bowls of sunrise. Pure idealisms despite their elevation often have a tell-tale background.

In our contemporary confusions we confront scruples and idealisms of the same general lineage, no doubt. As far as the Bible is concerned these predispositions operate through a different type of literalism, one that focuses on the Sermon on the Mount, or through a Biblical liberalism that sentimentalizes. Confusions of this order are particularly notable in all that concerns what we may call the necessities of social control: the role of the state, sanctions in the community, non-resistance, and allied topics. It is not our concern to query all types of conscientious non-cooperation with the community, but we wish that the George Brush variety would examine the corollaries of their view and work through to a judicious and defensible position.

It is often stated, for instance, that "spiritual weapons alone," "love without limit," exhaust the kinds of social action permitted to Christians. But few of those who repeat these axioms accept the full logic of them. "Love trusted to the limit" does not envisage the judicial coercion of those who sell cocaine to school-children, a practise noted by Jane Addams in the vicinity of Hull House. Nor does it envisage the inevitable restraint of the neighbor who persecuted, by the use of fire arms, the Quaker community at Wallingford, Pennsylvania, a few years

ago. And if we have accepted the necessity and propriety of the use of coercion in such cases as these, we have opened the door to further forms of public force. It is necessary to hark back to such elementary facts despite the protests of conscience objectors. For though most of them deny that they are absolute pacifists, their insistence on redemptive procedures alone prove that they really are.

The point is, we misconceive the principle of "love without limit." God himself does not confine himself to this expression, nor is it only by "the method of the Cross" that he deals with men. Apart from this method, which is indeed fundamental, his universe is so ordered that sharp duress and coercive penalties fall on men for disobedience. The Christ, while his ultimate appeal to men lay in his inoffensive passion, assumed and consented to the framework of social controls within which his redemptive act was carried out. He attacked the abuses of the corporate political order but acknowledged its legitimate uses, as did Paul. Even in his own activity, and that directed to spiritual or at least theocratic ends, the cleansing of the Temple found a place, which though it did not involve physical violence against persons represented another form of action than that of naked love.

Indeed, a wide area of confusion is opened up when Christians invoke "the method of the Cross" or "the principle of the Cross" without distinctions and definitions. It stands for a way of life and a choice of procedure of utmost significance and power, and it has in mind not a human but a divine instance of the influence of suffering love. For Christian thought has seen in the Cross not only the redemptive love of Jesus of Nazareth, but also the acceptance of cost and travail by God himself. The "method of the Cross" has its appropriate, indeed, its central, place in the overcoming of moral evil. But we call attention to the fact that this method, this principle of vicarious suffering, is both more universal and more limited than is usually recognized by those who would conform all ethical action to the example of Christ.

It is more universal in that the whole range of life is witness to the moral power of vicarious suffering. It is illustrated in the death of the patriot, in the long wrestling with poverty and Philistinism on the part of the artist, in the obloquy and persecution of an incorruptible statesman, in the martyrdom of Gandhi's youth—witnessing to the Truth

by coercive non-violence, a non-violence in this case that admits and proposes economic injury to the opposition; in all these cases as well as in the Cross of Christ. It is a law of life the operation of which can be counted upon in all areas, wherever men are found who are willing to take upon themselves the social responsibility of the soldier or public servant, the striker, the pioneer, or indeed of parent, teacher and citizen. In those multitudinous situations it is in such forms that the "principle of the Cross" has its effective expression, not to be hastily condemned in favor of some more abstract, purer and perhaps more irresponsible form of social atonement. Such costs paid throughout the length and breadth of the world's whole texture of life are the prices of human order. By them men ransom one another, and those that are strong bear the burdens of the weak. "Upon such sacrifices, Cordelia, the gods themselves throw incense."

Just for that reason the "method of the Cross" in its strict sense instanced in the Passion of Christ has a more limited, if more central, role. We shall not adopt a familiar form of this position by pleading the entirely unique character of Christ and his calling, on dogmatic lines. But we would point out that special occasions sometimes arise in the non-political sphere where the issues at stake are deeper than those of man's corporate social arrangements. The occasion of Christ's death was one of these. On such occasions the method of the Cross, in the particular sense of harmlessness and the repudiation of force, is appropriate, nay, imperative. We do not mean that the issues in such cases are ever completely unrelated to political issues. Christ's costly witness to the true theocratic calling of his people was no doubt pursued with a recognition of the political perils of Zealotism. But we mean that the issues that gathered about his life were issues of a particular kind, and that his solution for them should by no means be made a universal rule for his followers in all circumstances.

There are occasions for all of us who call ourselves Christians when we should fulfil more perfectly the law of love and non-violence, more particularly in personal relations, but Christian responsibility falls for us in a very much larger degree than for the first Christians in the area of citizenship and the public order. It argues a certain overboldness on the part of modern Christians to adjudge themselves designated and

qualified to turn their backs on this needy area. One of the recurrent forms of archaism in modern Christianity is to see the patterns of Christian discipleship in terms of the days of the primitive church, and to forget that Christ fulfils himself in many ways. History from time to time does bring its conjunctions when the issues of the Christian life in society resemble those of the time of the first proclamation of the gospel. In such times the faithful are by the very nature of the case apart from the world and without a voice in or responsibility for its institutions and order. "Who made me a judge or divider over you?" (Jesus). "For what have I to do with judging them that are without?" (Paul). The unique vocation of Christ, unique for other and more important reasons, had its setting in such circumstances. We do not raise the question of eschatology, but there is a sense in which Christ's expectation of the end of the world determined the other-worldliness of his outlook and action, and in which it distinguishes his calling from ours. His apocalyptic eschatology was an expression of the depth of the issues with which he was concerned. In its own way, even though not in the way that Schweitzer understood it, it evidences the focus of his life upon primordial and final matters in keeping with his central position in the spiritual life of the race.

Yet it is significant that even Christ, since he was fully man, and since he reflected all sides of God's providential dealing with man, did not act at that level at all times. The redemptive note corresponded to one level, surely the deepest, in his rich existence. The earnest and far-sighted dispositions in his campaign for the conversion of his people correspond to another level of his existence, and they included the cleansing of the Temple. The providential rule of God over human life includes both love and law. The Cross is by no means the only way in which the God of the New Testament deals with men. Christ could use very austere and anthropomorphic language about the divine procedure with men. God presses men by his law and invites them by his love. To neglect the former aspect, and its corollaries for those who have social responsibility, is to be sentimental and quixotic.

Thus the way of the Cross will be incumbent on Christians always in its larger sense of costly responsibility, but in its narrower sense of

defenceless love it will have a role determined by very special circumstances, by spiritual occasions. It will also be determined by our own peculiar personal endowment and fitness. The Cross came at its proper hour or *Kairos* when the event was ripe. The lesser Calvaries of Christian history have the same character. The event finds the man, rather than vice versa. It is true that in all times individuals are born with so particular a talent or calling that we are disposed to recognize their exemption from the common social task. They are largely absolved of communal responsibility on the political level in favor of their unique personal or artistic contribution. One might say this even of groups, such as the Quakers. Beethoven, we are told, continued with his composition while Napoleon's armies were at the gates of Vienna. But are there not too many today who see themselves designated to such special witness! A young man once informed a discerning English bishop that he had decided to take holy orders. "The question is," replied the bishop, "have you received them?"

We have referred to the fact that Christians are likely to be impatient with the immediate and relevant social tasks in favor of some abstract, and supposedly purer, form of social atonement. They are inclined to overrun their commissions in virtue of an admirable fear of compromise but misled by a plethora of confusions and simplicities as to the nature of man, the character of history and the application of the gospel. We do not wish to reproach the truly elect, whose matured calling has reached the point of conviction through first-hand grappling with evil. We do believe that these have some responsibility for the present confusions in so far as they have condoned the loose thinking of the larger number that have not their vocation. But all in all, since the time of Cervantes the times have not been so propitious for the emergence of a type of unreality in Christian discipleship as in American liberal Christianity, where on a background of prosperous middle class optimism about man and a Utopian eschatology there has come the shock of a world revealed in its true nature. Our athletic and buoyant Christian type takes the events of the last thirty years as a personal affront and reacts by way of rejecting the whole sorry tangle and in espousing a quixotic role. Exiling itself from the lists of flesh and blood, it has no other course than to prosecute its raids in the pure

inane. Its gesture and onsets are delivered on a plane of fancy. Its Christian drama is played out on a stage of fiction. Meanwhile the causes of constructive Christian ethics go by default.

To put it in other terms, we are guilty of impatience, not the impatience of Christ, but the impatience of men, and we vent our impatients in a futile idealism. All is said in the response of the angel to Esdras: "Do not thou hasten above the most Highest: for thy haste is in vain to be above him, for thou hast much exceeded." As a matter of fact the comparison to Don Quixote is unfair to that ancient knight. We are more subtle in our analysis of motives today, thanks to the psychologists, and we cannot put down the motives of quixotry so simply to pure chivalry or explain it solely on grounds of confusion. The psychological study of typical Marxist intransigents, such as has been outlined by Edmund Wilson, might be carried farther. It suggests that such ideologies are often determined by irrational factors, by conscious grievances, compulsions or traumas. In any case we know that there are such things as compulsions springing from unrest within, or from a sense of impotence, often wholly understandable in the present situation of our religious institutions, which concur with other motives in leading us to an intransigent position. The natural tendency is to seek to compensate for apparent ineffectiveness by resort to an extreme in the position adopted. That at least gives the impression of decisiveness, and, more subtly, some solace to conscience, or to the wide-spread guilt neurosis of our Puritan heritage.

It is true that the Church must rebuke the world and will always have its prophets and martyrs. These will be effective as they choose their ground wisely and competently. Today those Christians who have ripe professional training and experience—Christian laymen and social scientists for the most part—should be the first to diagnose our present anarchy and its causes. But it cries to heaven that the characteristic need of our period of world history is for men of good will and expertness who will offer themselves as social engineers for a great task of political reconstruction, accepting frankly all the relativities involved. Those who refuse this service or forbid it to Christians on the ground of some shibboleth of non-compromise need to rethink their ethics. The central function of the Church in witness to the redemp-

tive principle must take first place, but it must not exclude those related services by which health is made available and effective in the whole fabric of society.

"Of all forms of genius goodness has the longest awkward age." This aphorism on the title-page of *Heaven's My Destination* is a telling commentary on Christian ethics as we see it in wide areas of our liberal Protestantism.

ARAMAIC AND GREEK GOSPELS

By C. C. McCOWN

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The problem as to the original language of the synoptic Gospels has been brought again into the foreground by the simultaneous publication of another large and learned book by Professor C. C. Torrey and an important and well-documented article by Professor A. T. Olmstead.¹ Professor Torrey's book attempts to strengthen the arguments of his two previous volumes and numerous articles which maintain the thesis that all four Gospels are translations of Aramaic originals. Professor Olmstead undertakes to prove merely that there was a considerable Aramaic literature in Jesus' day and that, therefore, the writing of the Gospel story in Aramaic was not only possible but probable. Like Dr. Torrey,² he finds some Talmudic evidence for the actual existence of Aramaic Gospels.

The recent criticisms by New Testament scholars and by some Semitists of the theory of original Aramaic Gospels have been numerous and vigorous—to use no stronger term. Indeed no recent issue in historical criticism, as distinguished from theology, has been so bitterly discussed. One might think that the fundamental Christian verities were menaced.

I

Aside from personalities and pontificalities, such as have long rendered Continental academic circles amusing to the outsider, the dispute seems to arise in part from a misunderstanding of the actual claims

¹ Torrey, *Documents of the Primitive Church*, New York: Harper, 1941; Olmstead, "Could an Aramaic Gospel be Written?" *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, I (1942), 41-75. Dean Colwell's arguments in *The Greek of the Fourth Gospel*, Chicago, 1931, are widely regarded as sufficiently disposing of the claim that that Gospel is a translation from Aramaic, and that Gospel is not considered here. Many of his arguments apply also to the Synoptics.

This paper was read in part before the 1942 meeting of the Pacific Coast section of the Society for Biblical Literature and Exegesis and has profited from the ensuing discussion.

² *Op. cit.*, 91-111.

of New Testament scholars. An excellent illustration of this occurs in Professor Olmstead's article. He remarks that New Testament students "have set their face like a rock against the very possibility of translation Greek in the Gospel documents," and he quotes a clause from Professor Goodspeed to prove his point.³ On the contrary, no New Testament specialists deny translation Greek in the Synoptics. When Professor Goodspeed wrote that "no New Testament specialists have accepted such positions," he was actually referring, not to translation Greek, but to the theory that there was a single original Aramaic Gospel from which the four Gospels were ultimately derived, a theory broached in various forms by J. G. Eichhorn (1794), Bishop Herbert Marsh (1801), and Edwin A. Abbott (1900—Hebrew or Aramaic), a theory closely related to that which Professor Torrey is attempting to establish.⁴

That Professor Goodspeed does not reject "the very possibility of translation Greek in the Gospel documents" is explicitly stated a few pages over. The words of Jesus and the earliest accounts of his life came to us from Aramaic, as "no serious student of the Gospels" doubts. This fact, he thinks, accounts for most of the genuine Semitisms in the Gospels.⁵ One could cite pages of references to prove that all New Testament scholars are prepared to accept at least that statement while some few believe the ultimate sources of the Synoptics to have been written in Aramaic and some might say the same of Mark itself. This is no recent shift of opinion. Since Dalman wrote his *Worte Jesu* (1898) and Wellhausen his *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (1905), those who would deny such views have practically disappeared.

II

Another source of unnecessary dispute is the extent of the influence of the Septuagint upon the New Testament documents. It must not be forgotten that all the books of the early Christians were written by and for people whose Bible was the Old Testament in Greek. Their Greek

³ *Op. cit.*, 45 f., and note 1, quoting from E. J. Goodspeed, *New Chapters in New Testament Study* (New York, 1937), 144.

⁴ Cf. D. W. Riddle, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIV (1935), 127 f.; McCown, *Search for the Real Jesus* (New York, 1940), 135 ff., 164 ff., 171-75.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 148. Excellent summaries of opinion are found in M. Goguel, *Introduction au Nouveau Testament*, I (Paris, 1923), 268-71, 352-57.

Bible meant to them even more than the English Bible meant to the early Puritans. It was natural that all of their language should be interlarded with biblical phrases when they were discussing religious questions. All prayer, all liturgy, and even religious narrative would intentionally or unconsciously imitate the style of the Septuagint. In so doing the early Christian would be translating as little as the Puritan divine or politician, but, to an unsuspecting Semitist, he would seem to be rendering Aramaic or Hebrew idiom into Greek. The first two chapters of Luke may have been written first in Hebrew, as so many New Testament scholars are ready to admit. But even the famous hymns which appear there could be put together in almost their entirety out of phrases from the Septuagint.

The extensive influence of the Septuagint upon Christian writers has long been taken for granted by New Testament scholars. Many of them, Deissmann for example,⁶ have emphasized the necessity of Septuagint studies for the student of the New Testament and early Christianity, while Old Testament scholars have confined themselves too much to Hebrew. However, it is easy to misstate the case for the similarity between the Greek of the Septuagint and that of the New Testament. Generalizations here are unusually dangerous. Neither collection is uniform as to its Greek. Parts of the Septuagint are very poor translations. Parts of it, especially the Law, are well done, most surprisingly so when the difficulties and the absence of precedents are considered. Yet even the Law, perhaps because it is the law, is sometimes slavishly rendered. In spite of the translation Greek and the imitation and quotation of the Septuagint in the New Testament, surely a keen sense for style can catch the difference between Mark and Genesis, between Luke and Deuteronomy.

III

Another mistaken source of criticism from the Semitic side arises from a failure to take account of the history and present status of the controversy over "New Testament Greek." Many of the statements in the writings of Adolf Deissmann, Albert Thumb, James Hope Moulton, George Milligan, and A. T. Robertson can be appreciated only against the smoke of the lurid battle between the Hebraists, or

⁶ *Bible Studies* (Edinburgh, 1903), 77 ff., *Philology of the Greek Bible* (London, 1908), 3-15.

Jargonists, and the Purists. Modern New Testament scholars, beginning with Deissmann half a century ago, have been convinced by the philological evidence that the Greek of the New Testament was neither a Jewish-Greek jargon (an ancient Yiddish), nor pure classical Greek, nor, indeed, a language of the Holy Spirit sent down from heaven to express hitherto-unknown Christian ideas, but the language of the common people of the Greco-Roman world. In trying to win appreciation for the new point of view, they may occasionally use exaggerated language, but few have gone so far as to deny the Semitic coloring in the synoptic Gospels due to translation and to the Septuagint. Interest in Aramaic and the Koinē have advanced together.⁷

Judged by their arguments, the "Aramaicists" seem not fully to appreciate the complicated results of the evolution of the Greek language in Hellenistic times nor the exact position of New Testament philologists regarding the Koinē of the synoptic Gospels. Attic, Ionic, and other Greek dialects of the classical period contributed to the *koinē dialektos*, the "common speech," which prevailed throughout much of the Mediterranean world for nearly a millennium, from the time of Alexander to that of Mohammed. During this long span the evolution of the Greek language can easily be followed because literary works, papyri, inscriptions, and other documents are remarkably plentiful. Out of it came medieval and modern Greek, which often assist in explaining the developments that took place. During this period local dialects disappeared, but there were many varieties of the Koinē, as there are of any living language.

There were those who spoke a "barbarous Greek," evidently a jargon of their mother tongue and Greek. There was a sailors' Greek, doubtless also a merchants' Greek, probably a thieves' Greek, and many more that arose among the vast uneducated populations of the Roman Empire. Educated people likewise had their colloquial language, as educated people in all lands have today. There was also a literary Koinē. Polybius is usually taken as an excellent representative of a stage of the natural evolution through which the literary language passed at the hands of native Greeks. But many who were not native

⁷ See A. T. Robertson, *Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (4th ed., New York, 1923), 102-08, with many bibliographical notes; Blass-Debrunner, *Grammatik der nt. Griechisch*, 4th ed. (Göttingen, 1913), 1-5, and Index s.v. "Semitismen"; L. Radermacher, *Neutestamentliche Grammatik*, 2d ed. (Tübingen, 1925), 1-37. For the earlier period cf. V. H. Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, II (Cambridge, 1909), 61 ff., 68 f. These may serve as samples.

Greeks and many Greeks who were reared under non-Greek influences took in hand the writing of Greek literature. Thus among critics and pedants there developed Alexandrian Greek, full of preciosities and artificialities, and among rhetoricians Asianic Greek, with its bombast and exaggerations. Against these last two arose the classicistic, or Atticistic, reaction, of which Dionysius of Halicarnassus is taken as the originator.⁸ Doubtless the Cynic-Stoic street preacher used a very different style from that of the polished and stately lecturer Euphrates, whom Pliny admired. Musonius and Epictetus hardly spoke as did Apollonius of Tyana. All of these varieties of the "common Greek" of New Testament times must be borne in mind.

The language of the New Testament is equally lacking in uniformity. New Testament philologists find it necessary to classify the various New Testament writings into several groups according to the type of Koinē used. For example, the Epistle to the Hebrews is literary Koinē. Paul writes in the colloquial Greek of the educated, with an occasional touch of the Asianist and many traces of the diatribist,⁹ besides a Septuagint coloring. The Gospels represent a type of the colloquial Koinē which is superior in grammar and vocabulary to the letters of uneducated workingmen and women found in great numbers in Egyptian papyri, but is far from the literary Koinē of Hebrews, and is much simpler than the elevated colloquial of Saint Paul. Yet, aside from the Apocalypse, no New Testament book is written in a Jewish-Greek jargon.

IV

From their arguments it would seem that the "Aramaicists" are fully aware neither of the character of the Koinē nor of the nature of the evidence as to the Greek of the Gospels. Unfortunately for the New Testament student, very few religious texts in the simple vernacular of the uneducated, aside from the Christian writings, have been preserved. To the ancient scholar they were not literature.¹⁰ There

⁸ Cf. Wilhelm Schmidt in *Christi Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, II, 1 (6th ed., Munich, 1920), 308-19; Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, I (Leipzig, 1898), 251-300, 344-92.

⁹ Cf. R. Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, Göttingen, 1910.

¹⁰ On Christian "literature" cf. Norden, *op. cit.*, II, 465-512, especially the position of Fr. Overbeck in 1882, *ibid.*, 479, and Stählin in *Christi Gesch. d. griech. Lit.*, II, 2 (5th ed., Munich, 1913), 907 ff.

was no reading public to whom the ancient publisher could sell them. Therefore few copies were made and they disappeared when Christianity conquered. The aretalogies of such a rhetorician as Aristides are far removed from the cultural level of the Gospel writers. The "Aramaicists" complain that the New Testament scholar goes to letters and business documents for parallels to Gospel locutions. If semantic and grammatical usages similar to those in the New Testament are found in such documents, the proof actually is all the stronger that the early Christians were talking and writing colloquial Greek and that not every idiom that sounds Semitic points to a Semitic original.

However, inscriptions and Egyptian rubbish heaps have preserved a few comparable religious documents which are not private letters or business documents but are, perhaps mistakenly, classed usually as literary. They serve to set aside one of the arguments most often used by Semitists who wish to prove the Semitic color of the early Christian documents, the argument based upon paratactic style. A most plausible case is made out when it is discovered that this style is combined with a change in the second and following verbs to the present tense (Mk. 4.1; 6.50, etc.). This may seem to the Semitist surely to be the literal translation of the Hebrew perfect followed by an imperfect with *wau* consecutive, or of the Aramaic perfect with following participle used as a historic, or dramatic, present. The use, however, of a historic present is far from unusual in other than Semitic languages and occurs in the Koinē. James Hope Moulton called attention to its use in both Attic and modern Greek as well as in the colloquial of the modern English serving maid.¹¹ Perhaps the translation or the recollection of "answered and said" in Aramaic, where the second verb is a present participle, may be responsible for the frequency of the usage *apokritheis legei* in the Gospels. Once Mark (7.28) has "answered and says." But it will be noticed that neither is a literal translation of the Aramaic idiom. The Aramaic use of the participle in narration may be responsible for Mark's unusual use (151 cases) of the historic present, in some cases by direct translation, in others by indirect stimulation. But again it may be merely a colloquialism.

Many examples of simple, paratactic Greek have been cited by Deissmann and others. An example which appears not to have been

¹¹ *Grammar of NT Greek*, I (Edinburgh, 1908), 120 ff. Cf. Bauer and Leander, *Grammatik des Biblisch-Aramäischen* (Halle, 1927), 294-6.

used is worth quoting. A second-century Oxyrhynchus fragment of an aretology in praise of Zeus-Serapis can hardly be supposed to be a translation from Aramaic, but it exhibits in brief compass exactly the Semitic coloring so often detected in the Gospels. Only the conclusion of the document survives. It runs:

... "he said: For thy sake I will bestow the water on the people of Pharos. And having said farewell to him, he sailed away and gives the water to the people of Pharos and takes from them as pay 100 silver drachmae. And this act of grace (*aretē*) is registered in the libraries of Mercurium. Let those present say, 'There is one Zeus-Serapis.' (Subscription) *Aretē* of Zeus-Helios, great Serapis, regarding Syron the pilot."¹²

The two subjects of paratactic style and the historical present are especially important because they emphasize a point which the "Armaicists" do not seem sufficiently to consider: the similarities of style in the simple colloquial speech of all languages. The use of the historical present in story telling is one mark of popular, colloquial speech. Paratactic style, "and . . . and . . . and . . ." is universal—and equally wearying—in nearly all languages. Many have no other. Asyndeton is almost equally common. Because of their lack of particles and subordinating conjunctions, the Semitic languages were condemned forever to this simplicity of construction. The much abused *wau* has to express a great variety of nuances of relationship. The Aramaic *di* had to serve for a large proportion of the subordinating usages which more highly developed languages express by a variety of conjunctions. The colloquial of simple-minded, unlettered people has a similar vivid, direct, uncomplicated structure in every language. It is not, therefore, in the least a mark of Semitic influence. Much of the "Semitic thinking" discovered in New Testament documents is merely simple, vivid thinking. One of the reasons why the Bible, both the Old and the New Testament, has been so effectively translated into hundreds of languages is its lack of peculiarities and artificialities such as render classical Latin and Greek so difficult and so instructive to the learner, so attractive to the learned.

V

Dr. Torrey's chief argument for original Aramaic Gospels is the mistakes of translation which he believes it possible to discover in the

¹² *Pantheon*, ed. H. Kleinknecht (Stuttgart, 1929), 70, from *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XI (1915), 1382, written on the back of an official account of land taxation, which mentions the eighteenth year of Hadrian or Antoninus.

Greek of the Gospels and the much better sense which he can work out of the Aramaic into which he retranslates the "mistaken" Greek. New Testament scholars entirely accept the principle. It has long been used to discover the original language and the milieu of many ancient works, such as Ecclesiasticus, 1 Maccabees, and the Apocalypse of Enoch. That it has value in clearing up difficult passages is fully accepted. It is against an exaggerated use of the practice and undue reliance upon it that protest is made.

In *Our Translated Gospels* Dr. Torrey discusses 24 instances in which according to his belief, the text of Mark represents a mistranslation, 18 similar mistakes in Matthew, which he nevertheless regards as an excellent translation, and 31 errors in Luke. There can be no doubt that some of these passages do indicate mistranslation. It is entirely possible that he has made the correct emendation in some instances. But in many more it is difficult for others to accept his proposals. Some are prosaic and reduce a brilliant saying to banality. Some are not in keeping with ancient custom; others, which may not be objectionable, cannot be regarded as improvements. Some of these conjectural emendations appear to start from an uncritical Greek text. The most damning fact of all is that the "Aramaicists," Montgomery, Torrey, and Burney for example, do not, to any noticeable extent, agree among themselves as to the passages which are mistranslations or as to the Aramaic lying back of them.

The inescapable dangers in the use of mistranslations as a proof of the Aramaic origin of the Gospels and still more as a means of interpretation arise from the fact that the method rests upon two assumptions, both of them often colossal. First there is the purely subjective judgment on the scholar's part that the text is wrong, and second the equally subjective confidence that he knows what it should be. The first may be clear. But what of the second? It involves two further assumptions, first that he has the correct idea, second that he knows the words in which it was originally expressed. Except in outstanding cases, where difficulty is patent, it requires colossal egotism on a scholar's part to pretend to such inspiration, or, shall we call it, long-distance telepathy, and to insist that such guessing has the value of demonstration. In such a field pontifical dogmatism is entirely out of place. Pages of conjectural emendations proposed by the best scholars of former generations in both the biblical and the classical fields could

be listed, practically all of which have been proved mistaken by subsequent discoveries of manuscripts and inscriptions. In the case of the Gospels, the scholar may guess without fear of a similar final judgment, but he should remember that his best ideas are only guesses. No sin of scholarship is so completely unforgivable as the pretension to know what cannot be known.

VI

Two subjects involved in the theory under examination, the synoptic problem and the date of the Gospels, might be reviewed at length. Since, however, both have been worn threadbare during a hundred and fifty years of vigorous discussion and the "Aramaicists" have presented little new evidence and no new arguments, no good end would be served by entering into them in detail. But it may be well to clear up misconceptions which might arise from overconfident statements that have been made and from alleged conclusions that rest upon a very slender basis.

The proof of an early date for the Synoptics would not establish as fact the theory that they were composed in Aramaic, although a late date renders their Aramaic origin dubious. Dr. Torrey's labors over the date of Mark¹³ have produced no arguments that had not already been considered and refuted in the literature on the New Testament which he ignores. The appeal which he and Dr. Olmstead make to "early" rabbis who mention the *gilyonim* and the writings of the *minim*¹⁴ likewise fails to strengthen their case, for all the rabbis who may certainly be quoted belong to the second generation of *Tannaim* (90-130 A.D.), and even Yohanan ben Zakkai, whose use of the terms is uncertain, lived and flourished as the head of the Jewish schools after 70 A.D. and, therefore, proves no date earlier than that usually accepted for Mark, shortly before or after the fall of Jerusalem. If the term *gilyonim* is derived from *evangelion*, it would seem to be Greek, not Aramaic, Gospels which these rabbis were discussing. If not so derived, it offers no proof as to the Gospels.

The synoptic problem, which Dr. Torrey discusses somewhat briefly, considering its complications, is another stumbling block. The solution he proposes is one of the best refutations of his theory that the

¹³ *Documents of the Primitive Church*, 1-10.

¹⁴ Torrey, *op. cit.*, 91-111; Olmstead, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, I, 64 f.

Gospels were written in the decades just after 40 A.D., for he has to suppose an editorial and translational activity much more complicated and much more modern than any ever proposed by advocates of a two-document or four-document theory. Mark wrote in Aramaic. Matthew had both the Aramaic and Greek Mark as well as other sources before him. Luke had apparently all of these and the Greek translation of Matthew at hand. It sounds like a poorly equipped student writing a doctor's thesis, and at the same time it resembles a propaganda agency like the numerous sects which flood our mailboxes with waste paper.¹⁵

Neither the synoptic problem nor the date of the Gospels has final and decisive value in settling the question as to whether the Gospels were originally composed in Aramaic. Both problems must be settled on their own merits and by investigations much more careful and comprehensive than those discussed or than the review attempted here. They are, historically speaking, of great importance and should not be made secondary to the settling of a very different problem.

VII

One important corollary which ought to be drawn from the arguments of the "Aramaicists" has been suggested by Professor W. R. Taylor, Professor Gerhard Kittel, and Dr. Paul Fiebig.¹⁶ The method of criticism by means of form history has taken little account of the Aramaic origin of the Gospels. In the main its nomenclature and its "forms" have been taken from Greek. It has, of course, reckoned formally with the possible Palestinian origin of certain forms, but it has practically ignored this area of investigation. The extent to which Greek "forms" and adaptation to a Greek milieu occur in the Gospels has not been sufficiently considered by some of the "Aramaicists."¹⁷

¹⁵ *The Four Gospels* (N. Y. and London, 1933), 260-63; see *Our Translated Gospels*, xli-lxiii. Cf. D. W. Riddle, "The Aramaic Gospels and the Synoptic Problem," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIV (1935), 127-38.

¹⁶ Taylor, "Aramaic Gospel Sources and Form-Criticism," *Expository Times*, XLIX (1937-8), with excellent list of passages showing translation Greek; Kittel, *Die Probleme des palästinischen Spätjudentums u. das Urchristentum* (Stuttgart, 1926), 34-70; Fiebig, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu im Lichte der rabbinischen Gleichnisse des nt. Zeitalters* . . . Tübingen, 1912; *Die Erzählungsstil der Evangelien im Lichte des rabbinischen Erzählungsstil untersucht* . . . Leipzig, 1925, and several other works of similar character.

¹⁷ Cf. McCown, "Luke's Translation of Semitic into Hellenistic Custom," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVIII (1939), 213-20.

This field of investigation should not be ignored. Whether the controversy over the original languages of the Gospels can be thus settled is unimportant. It will provide material which will give more body to the airy fantasies which have invalidated some types of form criticism.

VIII

There are certain unfortunate elements in some of the discussions which have urged the Aramaicist point of view: a pontifical tone, gross exaggerations, a presentation of hypothesis as fact, and absence of proof, the substitution of assertion for evidence, a refusal to consider or even mention counter arguments, apparent ignorance of New Testament scholarship. All this raises a doubt as to whether there is any truth at all in a view so poorly argued. There is scarcely any need to urge New Testament students not to suffer from a feeling of inferiority in the face of such attacks. One wonders rather if such use of data and such reasoning do not indicate a hopelessly falacious hypothesis. However, these weaknesses do not mark all who have entered the lists on the Aramaicist side nor all that has been urged in the Aramaicist argument. It is, therefore, extremely important for the future of New Testament scholarship that constructive results should be sought, and that the exaggerations of controversy should not become dogma.¹⁸

What the students of Hellenistic Greek believe to be a reasonable hypothesis—and most classical scholars agree—is that the Gospels were written in the language of the people, the Koinē Greek which was in ordinary use among common folk. As Albert Thum said when the evidence regarding the Koinē and the New Testament was far from being so full as it is today, "The translators of the Old and the authors of the New Testament followed the spirit of the Greek, not the Hebrew or Aramaic, language; biblical Greek represents no dialect, still less a jargon of the Koinē, but the popular speech of Hellenism lifted for the

¹⁸ Mention should be made of the article by J. A. Barton, *Journal of Theological Studies*, XXXVI (1935), 357-73, in criticism of the "Aramaicists" and that by J. A. Montgomery, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIII (1934), 79-99. Dr. Goodspeed's chapter in *New Chapters in New Testament Study*, 127-68, and the articles by Riddle cited above appear to me to constitute the answer which Dr. Montgomery asks. It is worth noting that a similar controversy in the nineties developed similar bitterness. Cf. J. T. Marshall, *The Expositor*, 4th Series, VIII (1893), 176-92. One of the best discussions is that of W. F. Howard in Moulton's *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, II (Edinburgh, 1929), 411-85.

first time into literature."¹⁹ The Evangelists were probably bilingual, and just as Albert Schweitzer and many others can write in either German or French, so they could compose a Gospel in either Aramaic or Greek. But they would not have written in Aramaic and then translated into Greek. Aside from technical religious terms, borrowed in part from Judaism, in part from Hellenistic religious usage, and sometimes given a peculiar Christian significance, the language of the New Testament was one "understood of the people," and would not have impressed its readers or hearers as being a Jewish-Greek jargon. Just as little in either pronunciation, grammar, syntax, style, or vocabulary would it have sounded familiar to the materialized spirit of Plato or Xenophon.

At the same time it would have had a flavor of its own, differentiating it from the language of the Greek mysteries and of popular aretalogies of Greek gods such as Asclepius. This was due in part to the fact, long freely acknowledged, that the words of Jesus and many of the narratives go back ultimately to spoken, and probably in most cases to written, Aramaic originals. In part this slightly foreign flavor—attractive doubtless to many who were dissatisfied with Greek sophistry and rhetoric—was due to the use of quotations from the Septuagint and from other translations of the Hebrew Bible, in part again to the unconscious influence of these translations upon their constant students, the early Christian preachers. In some cases, in Luke for example, there appears the intentional introduction of Semitic phrases, such as *kai egeneto*, in order, perhaps, to remind the reader that this was an ancient eastern wisdom, of divine origin, not the manufacture of Greek rhetoricians or curbstone preachers.

IX

If this series of conclusions is correct, there follow certain important consequences for the interpreter of the New Testament. Neither Deissmann nor Dalman can be neglected. What the New Testament, the synoptic Gospels in this case, meant to the people who read the books has to be determined from contemporary Greek. It is hardly probable that Paul or Apollos did any translation back into Aramaic, Barnabas might have done so unconsciously, but very few of

¹⁹ *Die griechische Sprache im Zeitalter des Hellenismus* (Strassburg, 1901), 185; cf. his discussion of the evidence, 120-32, 174-87.

the early Christians would have gone farther back, either consciously or unconsciously, than the Septuagint. Early Christianity was built upon the Septuagint and the Greek New Testament, both understood in the sense of the ordinary colloquial Koinē. Moreover the translators of the Aramaic originals, whether these were complete Gospels or scattered *diēgēseis*, were putting the gospel message into colloquial Koinē and explaining in that language what the Aramaic meant to them. The New Testament student can never dispense with the papyri and all the other contemporary records of Hellenistic Greek.

Having tried to discover what the early translators and compilers thought the message of Jesus to have been, the next step is to continue the work which Gustaf Dalman first seriously undertook a half century ago: the attempt to translate the Greek back into the Aramaic of Jesus and his Galilean disciples in order to discover what nuances of meaning may have been lost and what mistakes may have been made in the process of translation and compilation. Here the Septuagint is of additional value because it so often illustrates the types of errors into which a translation from a Semitic original may all too easily fall. But, naturally, the student's main reliance must be Aramaic documents roughly contemporary with Jesus and the Gospels. The increase in the extent of this material is most welcome and partially neutralizes Wellhausen's warning against efforts at retroversion into Jesus' own language, although George Foot Moore still echoed it fifteen years ago.²⁰

A fitting "conclusion of the whole matter" and, at the same time, a proper beginning are found in two articles, one written by Professor Donald W. Riddle in criticism of Professor Torrey, the other by Professor Millar Burrows in defense of the Aramaicist theory.²¹ Both discussions, if their combined observations are carefully weighed, point in the direction of a very fruitful field of study. It would appear to me that Professor Burrows may be somewhat too optimistic as to the resolution of problems of mistranslation. On the statement of another point also I would differ. It does not seem that the "final" question, if that means the most important question, is whether the entire Gospels, or only portions of them or their sources were translated. The most valuable service which retranslation into Aramaic can render is to in-

²⁰ *Judaism*, I (Cambridge, 1927), 185.

²¹ Riddle, "The Logic of the Theory of Translation Greek," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LI (1932), 13-30; Burrows, "Principles for Testing the Translation Hypothesis in the Gospels," *ibid.*, LIII (1934), 13-30.

crease the accuracy of our interpretations of the Gospels. Granted that Jesus' words must have been translated from Aramaic into Greek, can Aramaic scholars agree on the retranslation into Aramaic? Over against this, all the bother about the date and the completeness of the Aramaic sources is a waste of words.

As some institutions and some scholars have long held, no one can be an original and independent student of the New Testament unless he knows both Greek and Aramaic, with Hebrew and Syriac as well. The Talmud and the additional Aramaic materials which are slowly accumulating offer an immense field for study, and despite the dangers Wellhausen feared, the field is one which the New Testament student must enter and which, as Professor Olmstead intimates, he will find tremendously rewarding. The Aramaic language and Jewish custom interpret Jesus. Hellenistic custom and Hellenistic Greek interpret the early church.²²

²² An exceptionally useful and well-balanced survey of the question is that of Professor Floyd V. Filson, *Origins of the Gospels* (New York, etc., 1938), 56-84.

Reference should now be made to articles published since the above was written: Solomon Zeitlin, *JQR* XXXII (1942), 427-31; C. C. Torrey, *JBL* LXI (1942), 71-85; E. J. Goodspeed, *JNES* I (1942), 315-40.

Church Congress Syllabus No. 8

THE ANGLICAN TRADITION

PART I

OUR PLACE IN THE GREAT CHURCH

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[*Editor's Note:* This is the first of a series of four syllabi discussing the theological position of the Anglican Communion from several points of view.]

In a family conversation I recently heard it told with some pride how the child of a mixed marriage had (owing to the refusal of a Roman Catholic priest to answer an emergency call which was not quite *in extremis*) been "christened an Episcopalian." While the personal connections thus broken and established may have been of some importance, pastor and theologian alike are aware that such a phrase was inaccurate, indeed meaningless. One can be baptized into the Body of Christ, the Catholic Church. Genuine Christian baptism always means that and cannot mean anything else. It is after baptism that one adheres to or is brought up in a particular denomination or Communion. The bond thus created between the baptized has a reality which is often forgotten; it provides something in common, underneath all our divisions, which is shared by all those who have retained at least that minimum of sacramental practice. It is the belief of this writer that the Anglican tradition is marked by a primary emphasis on the common Christian heritage in faith and practice. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the implications of this principle, with a primarily positive intention. Any special reference that may be made to current controversies is purely incidental, due to the fact that one naturally tends to illustrate general principles from matters under discussion at the moment.

I

Our church system and Canon Law will provide the most immediate illustrations. As one is not baptized an Episcopalian, neither is one

confirmed in or into that sect. We received the laying-on of hands for the gift of the Holy Spirit, than which there is nothing more common to the Christian name. Let us note, indeed, how shadowy a body the Protestant Episcopal Church is. Canonically, I believe, it is a federation of certain dioceses. No individual belongs to it, nor any parish; we are confirmed as Christians and registered as communicants in our respective parish churches. Our status as Protestant Episcopalians, is thus doubly indirect. Even from a secular point of view the Protestant Episcopal Church barely exists; it could, I suppose, sue or be sued as a voluntary society, but it is not incorporated and can spend money, or receive it, only through its agents—the Treasurers of the General Convention and the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society. As this Church, therefore, has no membership, neither does it possess a ministry. One obvious feature of the episcopal ministry is that we did not invent it—whether anyone else did, and if so who, is a problem which I happily do not have to discuss here. I, to make this quite personal, am not an Episcopal minister, because there is no such thing (unless the term were to be considered a ponderous paraphrase for Bishop). Like my colleagues in this Church, I was ordained a deacon and priest in the Church of God. I am obliged to say that I do not see how that commission could possibly be extended—although I do hope in time to be welcomed to the exercise of that priesthood in a wider area than is open to me at the present.

It remains to observe that the Protestant Episcopal Church has no doctrine. This statement may seem startling to those who have promised “conformity to the doctrine, discipline, and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church” (which, I would remind the possible lay reader, each of our deacons is supposed to have done once, each priest twice, each Bishop three times, the last time in public). But in this doctrine to which we have sworn conformity there is no specifically Episcopalian tenet—nothing comparable to papal infallibility, predestination, believer’s baptism, or the other articles which have become the hall-marks of various denominations. It has been well observed that Anglicanism is distinguished among the great Christian traditions just by this fact, that it has no distinctive doctrine to put forward—though I believe that it shares this honorable distinction with the Eastern Orthodox. This does not mean that there is no doctrine taught by the Protestant Episcopal Church; it teaches what it has received, namely

the common teaching of the Catholic Church. It is for that Church that we pray in all our Offices, its Creeds that we profess, and to it that we ascribe "authority in Controversies of Faith" (Article XX).

This principle gives a partial answer to a problem which has troubled canonists in our Church, the limits to the authority of General Convention. Formally that body resembles the British Parliament rather than the American Congress—that is, it is limited by no written Constitution (since it can amend its own), nor by any guaranteed rights of those subject to it. Actually, Parliament is limited by being what it is, the legislature of a free country; similarly, General Convention cannot be more than what it is, a provincial synod of the Catholic Church. It controls the administration of our Church, to be sure, subject only to discretion and expediency. In this respect it is the heir of the royal supremacy as recognized in the Church of England from 1534 to 1776, and of the royal-papal power which *ecclesia anglicana* acknowledged in the centuries before that. But it cannot on its own authority alter the faith of the Church. Should it profess to do so, it would not be exercising its authority, but destroying it, since the more it varied from the position of a Catholic Synod the less right would it have to claim obedience from those who had recognized it as such. Only once has action of General Convention been challenged from outside, and then it was precisely on this point. The Proposed Prayer Book of 1785 made a number of amendments which seemed to have dogmatic significance, the most important being the omission of the Nicene Creed. Although this was not accompanied by a formal rejection of its teaching, it was suggestively parallel to the latitudinarian revisions then often proposed with that intent, of which the one still in use at King's Chapel, Boston, is the only survivor. Quite properly, the Diocese of Connecticut refused to join the General Convention and the English Bishops to bestow episcopal consecration on the Bishops-elect whom it endorsed until this misstep was rectified. One might profitably make a list of actions which General Convention cannot constitutionally perform. It cannot revise the dogmatic decrees of the General Councils. It cannot increase or reduce the number of the Sacraments. It cannot, I fear, make the Bible "the rule of faith"—not by Canon or Article, still less by resolution of a particular session. Since the days of the Fathers of the Church the Catholic creeds have been the *regula fidei*, providing the Church's guide to the truths to be found in Holy Scrip-

ture, which provides their proof (Article VIII). (Indeed the essence of the Apostles' Creed, the *kerygma* of Jesus and the threefold Name of God, is older than the New Testament as such.) Such I trust they will always remain among us as in other parts of the Church.

II

Though we have neither membership, ministry, or doctrine, it is obvious that we do exist. Two distinctive possessions which I will allow to the Episcopal Church are its form of worship and a certain tradition or tone of life. Yet the distinctiveness of the former is not complete. The title page of the Prayer Book describes it as a Book of the Rites of the Church, and only a subtitle adds further "according to the Use of the Protestant Episcopal Church"—as its various mediaeval predecessors contained this or that common Christian rite "*secundum usum insignis ecclesiae Sarum*." The most familiar parts of the Prayer Book represent the common stock of Christian liturgy; but some of its items reflect the new emphases of the Reformation, and its occasional prayers have been influenced by the current interests of the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. Neither in fact nor in theory has it ever included all Anglican devotion. But its offices have provided for the most regular and the most important acts of religion, and have set the general tone for the public worship and private piety of our Church. This can be summed up by saying that we use a historic rite simplified for use in the vernacular. We have chosen to remain in the great tradition of Catholic worship (the opposite of Catholic in this connection is not Protestant but individualist)—corporate, objective, sacramental, adoring. On the other hand, we have decided to purchase simplicity at the price of bareness rather than gain richness at the expense of losing popular appeal. Thus the Roman Mass and Office are in many ways in themselves fuller expressions of Christian worship than ours. But complexity as well as the Latin language removed them increasingly from popular knowledge and use—until in our own day the Liturgical Movement attempted to reverse the movement, achieving at least in some places results in popular sharing in liturgical worship which we do not always attain even with a vernacular rite. But Prayer Book worship at its best is objective and biblical and at the same time popular and in touch with the needs of the present. Few of us today

are so cheerfully self-centered as to call our liturgy "incomparable"; but at least it is a tradition of which we need not be ashamed.

Since we neither possess nor wish to possess any distinctive dogmatic book, we refer to the Prayer Book when occasion requires as stating the teaching of our Church. It therefore becomes necessary at certain times to engage in inquiry or even controversy as to what the Prayer Book does contain and teach. But this can never be anything but an unpleasant necessity. The proper use of the Prayer Book is, as it says, common prayer, which is the specific activity of Christians assembled as such. Nor do I mean this statement to imply any eulogy of worship or devotion as an activity isolated from the rest of life. The Christian life as a whole is liturgical—that is, it is a solemn act of sacrifice to God, in which our feeble and unworthy lives are united with the eternal sacrifice of Christ. The church service is a special moment within life when it becomes aware of its meaning and for a moment rests in the vision of the final end towards which we daily strive. This is why "service," degraded through that word sometimes becomes in common use, is a proper description both of the public worship of God and of the general tenor of the Christian life. Every one of our services (with the exception, for obvious reasons, of the Burial Office) sends us out through the church door to go and live as we have worshipped. It was not inappropriate that the dismissal, "Missa," became in western use the common term for the Church's central act of worship.

This has led us, as the discussion of any serious topic would, away from the things which are distinctive of the Episcopal Church and the Anglican Communion. The Prayer Book is ours; but the practical values of the Prayer Book lie in those aspects of it which are not peculiar to us. There is, however, an Episcopalian, or, more broadly, an Anglican, ethos. It can be best defined as the refusal to reject decisively any major element in the Christian tradition. We annoy others, and at times ourselves, by being both Episcopal and Protestant—or, as I should prefer to say, using terms with a fuller and more positive meaning, both Evangelical and Catholic. And I think it may be added that of all the Churches separated from Rome we have most often had some among us who feel that the papacy has an important and providential place in the Catholic Church, even though the terms at present imposed exclude us from its communion. Contrariwise, we are usually (certain

moments of controversial excitement excepted) willing to recognize the great contributions made by those who have separated from us in the Evangelical direction, and in some cases made possible by the very fact of that separation. The contribution of English Puritanism to Christian and national freedom is a case in point. Sometimes this generosity leads small groups inside our Church, or larger groups outside it, to the impression that we are about to surrender the balanced position which we have so long maintained. For those for whom Christian unity must be obtained immediately at any price the way is always open. We could, namely, always submit to the most rigid of the Christian communions, the one which is most unlikely to yield to anyone else in the measurable future, but which continues to proclaim itself the center of unity as well as the mother and mistress of all churches. On the other hand, there are those who note how much we have yielded in recent years of the intransigent episcopalianism of the past, and wonder whether this surrender will not shortly be complete. The present writer is convinced that it will not be, since sooner or later we come to the hard rock of a tradition which we did not form and therefore cannot alter—the tradition in which Scripture, Sacrament, Creed, and Episcopate are the salient features. That life-giving tradition was a gift to us, and it is not ours to give away.

III

There are two obvious causes of distress in the Anglican position. The first is that our very wealth of contacts leaves us in a position of isolation. We are, as it were, encamped on the famous ecclesiastical bridge, and must sometimes envy the comfort of our neighbors in their houses on either side. In our own country this isolation is more severe than in England, where *ecclesia anglicana* is the principal as well as the ancient church of the land. But here we claim to be Catholics; yet in the eyes of the largest body of our American fellow-Catholics we are mere pretenders to that glorious name. We are connected by innumerable ties with American Evangelicals—perhaps, indeed, in this connection the sociological and intellectual bonds are stronger than the theological and religious. But most of us are not really at home in that world either, and feel that we could become so only by denying principles which have been the very basis of our religious life, and indeed the inspiration of that desire for unity which makes us want to stretch out

the hand of friendship in all directions. A second cause of distress is that the great Church to which we belong does not have any clear visible existence. We have never, I believe, claimed to be ourselves the whole Catholic Church. Consequently we cannot think of our own communion as the object of ultimate ecclesiastical loyalty. If, as I have maintained, our own Church is but a grouping of dioceses, associated for mainly practical purposes, within a larger unity, it would seem essential that the great Church, the Catholic Church in other words, should have some means of expression—some way of stating its tradition and, perhaps, of introducing needed modifications into it. Our own theology, which is not our own, forbids us to take refuge in the idea of an invisible Church, or in asserting the relativity of all human embodiments of the Body of Christ. Where, then, is this Church to which we do belong, into which we baptize, and in whose name we teach?

These two problems may, I believe, find a single answer. It is true that the visibly united body of Christians, professing the same faith, sharing the same Sacraments, joined together in holy love, does not exist in its completeness. But wherever elements of catholicity are to be found, there is some part or at least some aspect of the Catholic Church. External signs are useful in this connection, since one of their purposes is to indicate the presence of inward life. There is a considerable bond of union which we share with the baptized—another which unites us with the bodies which retain the eucharistic worship of the ancient Church, celebrated by its apostolic priesthood. (Some such phrase as this is necessary, I believe, to indicate what is really meant by the Catholic ministry and its sacramental practice.) The basic faith of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds unites us with another group, and so we might continue listing different aspects of the common Christian tradition which we share with one body of believers or another. Nor do I see why we should not make the fullest use of the concept which has been introduced into modern Roman Catholic theology under the heading "soul of the Church." The nature of the body of the Church is to be external, since that is what bodies are, but its soul, its true life, is not limited to, although connected with, its body. (At this point the simile becomes somewhat confusing, but theological accuracy is more important than literary elegance.) In other words, all goodness and faith which are connected with the love of Jesus are part of the life of the

Catholic Church. The common recognition of this is an example of the fact that the church still can grow and find a voice to state new convictions. The growth of a common mind on social questions, as illustrated *e.g.* by the ten principles put out by English church leaders, is another.

Precisely how the specifically Protestant emphases are to be related to this principle is a problem too detailed for discussion here. There are, of course, many different tendencies covered by the general terms Protestant or Evangelical. One, for instance, is the personal piety of the 18th-century revivals which is the dominant background of American religion. In our own church at least this is not alien to catholicism, but a valuable corrective to "high and dry" orthodoxy. Another is the classical Reformation teaching of the primacy of God's dealing with the individual over his establishment of the Church, and therefore of Atonement over Incarnation. This, I think we must admit, is in its pure form the one complete alternative to Catholicism among Christian traditions, and therefore stands outside such a synthesis as our Church has endeavoured to achieve. Then there is the churchly Evangelicalism of modern missions, the Ecumenical Movement, and the Federal Council of Churches. There is a peculiar difficulty in the Anglican approach to this, because it is so close to being a competitor on our own ground. And whether to include in this summary the extreme liberalism which denies historical and biblical authority I am very doubtful. What our theology, and our church politics, should do is to recognize the facts of the Christian world. Let us realize that we live in a time when the Catholic Church is neither clearly visible nor wholly hidden, and in our life as members of it neither reject true words that may come to us from any quarter, nor feel that we must rush madly into the next proposal for making more visible that unity which we already possess.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

[*Editor's Note:* From now on, the Topics for Discussion will be grouped in three, for use at three meetings during each quarter following publication.]

1. *The spirit of the Prayer Book.* What is the significance of its constant reference to "thy Church"? how does it reflect ancient Catholicism (*e.g.* the Collects, structure of the Communion Office, etc.), interests of 16th-17th centuries (analyze phraseology of General Confession), and those of today? Is its picture of the worshipping community, whose whole life is sanctified by the primary fact of God, irrelevant to present conditions in both Church and World? Or can we find in it a needed corrective and a valuable program?

2. *Doctrine and ministry in the Episcopal Church.* Was Muhlenberg right in 1853 in calling on our Bishops to exercise a broader function as Catholic Bishops as well as their narrower duties in this Church (same for priests)? What authority do we appeal to when we say "the Church teaches" this or that? To what extent and in what ways do we possess in common with others the heritage summarized in the Lambeth Quadrilateral? Analyze the duties of a priest as stated in the Ordinal; and the relation of the Eucharist to all of Christian truth and all of human life according to the Communion Office.

3. *Some problems of the American situation.* How do sectional, racial, national, and class divisions affect our religious groupings? Observe this in the nation and the local community in special relation to the Episcopal Church. What hope can there be that American Anglicanism may act, as English seems to be doing, as a connecting link between (Roman) Catholic and Protestant approaches to social and international questions? Do we perform such a function in worship (note movements for vernacular liturgy among Roman Catholics, and for liturgical dignity among Protestants)? Has historic Christian worship roots in American life (suggest better American parallels for the English Church Militant Prayer)? "Who is enriched by the enrichment of worship?" (G. A. Coe).

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THE NICENE FAITH AND THE LEGISLATION OF THE EARLY BYZANTINE EMPERORS

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The century of the early Byzantine Emperors was the most significant period in the stabilization of the orthodox faith. In this stabilization the decisive factor was the policy of these very Emperors towards the Catholic faith. The purpose of this paper is to review that policy, as revealed mainly in their legislation.

The century is marked by three main events: (1) The promulgation of the Nicene Creed at the close of its first quarter, when Constantine the Great was the sole ruler of the Empire; (2) the climax of the struggle of Arianism against orthodoxy after the fourth Creed of Sirmium, when the power of Constantius II was at its height; and (3) the legalization of the orthodox faith as the first important legislative act of Theodosius the Great. That these events are indissolubly connected with the names of the three most influential Emperors of the fourth century indicates that the doctrine as developed by the Church received definitive fixation at the hands of the State. Here are the roots both of the growing Caesaro-papism and of the long-lasting struggle of the State with the Church.

For the period in question the Codex Theodosianus, promulgated on February 15, 438, and containing the imperial constitutions issued between 312 and 437, is the historic source *kat' exochên*. In using a legal source it is important to bear in mind that the constitutions "De Rebus Ecclesiasticis," collected in the sixteenth book, must, as legal rules, show the characteristics of all legal norms, namely the permission or the requirement of certain actions on the part of the people concerned. The actions permitted are their rights, the actions demanded their duties. To grant rights presupposes the recognition of a personality entitled to make use of them. To impose duties involves the subordination to the legislator of the one under obligation. These characteristics were very significant of both the legal nature of the early Church and its relation to the State. For, by granting rights to

the Church, the State implicitly recognized its legal personality; by imposing duties, the State exercised control over the Church, even its discipline and doctrine.

In reviewing the policy of the early Byzantine Emperors towards the Catholic faith three facts need to be considered: (I) The characteristics of the early Byzantine state church, its legal personality and its subjection to state control; (II) the Emperors' church policy wavering between tolerance and intolerance during the first three centuries of Christianity; (III) Theodosius' abandonment of the traditional policy of toleration, and his making himself 'Supreme Governor' of the Eastern Church.

I. It is true that a general law recognizing the legal personality of the Church cannot be found. However, the legislation of the fourth century followed the Roman tradition of issuing decrees to solve specific problems that had occurred. Herein, the Emperors' juriconsults were the wardens of classical Roman jurisprudence. Of their admiration for the writings of their great predecessors, especially for Papinian and Paulus, Constantine's constitutions of Sept. 28, 321, and Sept. 27, 327, (Cod. Theod. I, 4, 1 and 2) give full evidence. Again, a century later, Valentinian III, in his so-called quotation edict of Nov. 7, 426 (I, 4, 3), confirmed the writings of Papinianus, Paulus, Caius, Ulpianus, and Modestinus as authoritative. Hence, there can be no doubt that Constantine's counsellors knew the juridical implications in question when formulating the laws which were to grant privileges to the Catholic clergy, the right to accept legacies to the Catholic Church, and the competence to pronounce judgments to the episcopate.

Already Constantine's first constitution on ecclesiastical matters of Oct. 31, 313 (XVI, 2, 1) refers to privileges of the clergy, and numerous edicts followed to secure the clergy's immunity from public duties, ordinary and extraordinary taxes, collections, etc. (XVI, 2, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, etc.). According to Modestinus' "*regula iuris*" "*privilegia quaedam causae sunt, quaedam personae*" (Dig. L, 17, 157). If the privilege was granted to "*causae*," i.e. a body corporate, the latter itself was the objective of the favor bestowed by law; if it was granted to "*personae*," it was her status, her relation to public institutions which justified her being privileged. The status of the Catholic clergy is defined in Constantine's constitution of Oct. 21, 319 (XVI, 2, 2,): Those who in

divine worship serve the ministry of religion, i.e. those who are called clergy, are exempt, etc. . . . This legal definition implies the legal recognition of Christ's Church at least as a public institution. And as such the Church must have been recognized when the law of Oct. 31, 313 was issued.

However, at the latest in 321 the Church was recognized as a "causa," a body corporate. This can be concluded from the first sentence of Constantine's constitution of July 3, 321 (XVI, 2, 4), where there is conceded to everyone the right to bequeath to the most holy Catholic Church whatsoever he desires. This right of the legator presupposes on the side of the Church as the legatee the "testamenti factio passiva," i.e. the ability to receive legacies. But only persons or bodies recognized by the Roman law, i.e. either Roman citizens or legal institutions, were acknowledged to possess such an ability.

This constitution, addressed "ad populum" sc. urbis Romae, was, according to Gothofredus, "in omnium ore."¹ From now on, the so-called "testamentum ad pias causas" was admitted in favor of the Catholic Church, placing it on a par with the "collegia pontificum," "collegia augurum," and "sodalitates," "quibus permittum est corpus habere." To secure the effect desired, Constantine providently declared trifling all those subtle formalities ordinarily to be observed in legacies according to the law of succession, the most formal part of the "ius civile" (XVI, 2, 4).

It is the legal personality of the Catholic Church which makes comprehensible the competence of the bishops to pronounce decisions in civil lawsuits. Constantine's constitution of June 23, 318 (I, 27, 1), forbidding any judge to interfere with sentences pronounced by bishops acting as arbiters in lawsuits, seems to have been the first general law as to the "audientia episcopalis." Fifteen years later, Constantine, on May 5, 333, acknowledged the episcopal judicial competence even in regard to cases where only one litigant had asked for an episcopal judgment, while the other party disagreed (Const. Sirmondiana, 1).²

¹ Jac. Gothofredus, *Commentary to the Codex Theodosianus*, 2 ed., 1741, tom. VI, p. 27.

² Ayer, *A Source-Book for Ancient Church History*, 382, points out that later "this was reduced to cases in which there was an agreement between the parties." Such a reduction was ordered, however, not only by Honorius' law of Dec. 13, 408 (I, 27, 2) as Ayer asserts, but already by Arcadius' edict of July 27, 398 (Cod. Just., I, 4, 7). Ayer's remark that the law of Dec. 13, 408 is "the earliest extant" is incorrect also since the earliest law handed down is that of June 23, 318, mentioned above.

No doubt such a judicial authority of the bishops bears witness for their being intrusted with functions exercised otherwise only by functionaries of the State.

The State's control over the Church was directed at two aims: to keep the doctrine free from adulterations, and to watch over the true realization of dogma and creed, i.e. over discipline. The realization of the former aim depended upon prohibitive norms which were to frustrate heresy and schism. To realize the other aim, imperative laws would show the conduct demanded from both the clergy and the believers.

Already in his constitution of Oct. 31, 313, mentioned above, Constantine contrasted "*ecclesiae catholicae clericos*" with "*hereticorum factione*." It is the earliest legal document where the term "body of Christians," used so far, was replaced by the term "Catholic Church." Thirteen years later, in September, 326, he issued two similar constitutions, placing the schismatics on a par with the heretics (XVI, 5, 1) and declaring that the Novatians were not so utterly lost that that which they had requested should be denied (XVI, 5, 2). Here we see clearly that Constantine claimed to have the last word as to the line of demarcation between the Catholic Church on the one side, heresy and schism on the other. And so did his successors. By numerous severe laws against the heterodox they protected the right faith against heretical and schismatical adulterations. How widespread and multifarious heterodoxy still was under Theodosius II, is shown by his constitution of May 30, 428 (XVI, 5, 65), mentioning no less than twenty three different sects prohibited. To show their teaching and activities by analyzing the imperial constitutions in question would furnish valuable contributions to the dogmatic controversies. The heterodox doctrines are the shadows in the painting of the early Christology, each tuned in a different shade, but all together contrasting to, and thus making more luminous, the light of the right faith. However, in regard to the viewpoint at the outset, we are to confine ourselves to remarks first on the abuse of baptism, and then on the attempt of the executive power to exhibit the sources of right discipline.

In the first constitution under the headline "*Ne Sanctum Baptisma Iteretur*" (the sixth section of the sixteenth book), Valentinian I declares an African bishop unworthy of his priesthood (Feb. 20, 373;

XVI, 6, 1). He had "contaminated the sanctity of baptism by reiterating this grace, acting usurpingly against the institutions of all." Gothofredus certainly is correct in stating that this constitution was aimed at the Donatists.³ It was they who in the African diocese, like the Novatians in Rome half a century before, denied the validity of a sacrament celebrated by a clergyman unworthy of his ministry. True that a doctrinal subjectivism, later called "*ex opere operantis*," might have been more appealing to early Christians than the objective standpoint "*ex opere operato*." But, to make the validity of the sacrament dependent on particular convictions was against the imperial policy of church unity and therefore illicit. By depriving the antistes⁴ of his bishopric, Valentinian exercised his control over church discipline. But in spite of his adherence to the orthodox faith, indicated by his referring to the "*instituta omnium*," i.e. "*Evangeliorum Apostolorum traditionis incorruptae*,"⁵ he did not prohibit the sect, obviously on account of his policy of toleration.⁶

However, his successor Gratian, on Oct. 17, 377, instructed the Vicar of Africa to command the anabaptists "to desist from their fatal mistakes and to give back to the Catholic Church the building they retained against faith and trust." In strongest terms he condemned the error of those who in disregard of the "*praecepta Apostolorum*" dishonor the sacraments by the reiteration of baptism (XVI, 6, 2). The sentences following this instruction add to the "*Apostolorum praecepta*" other sources of discipline: "*institutiones eorum qui Apostolorum fidem . . . probaverunt*" and "*traditio incorrupta*."

Gothofredus does not comment on the "*Apostolorum praecepta*," obviously because they had not been discovered when his commentary was published in 1665. However, I do not doubt that Gratian was alluding not merely to a nebulous tradition, but to formative stages of Church customs subsequently recovered for us in the form of the Didaché, the Didascalia, and the so-called Apostolic Church Order,

³ Differing *V. Schulze* in *Encyclopedia of Rel. Knowledge* XII, 128, s. v. Valentinian I: "forbidding the Montanists to set aside baptism."

⁴ *Smith-Cheetham*, *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities* I, 103 supposes that the title "may have been suggested by the usage of the word *Archisynagogus* in the Jewish synagogue." However, the word belonged already to the vocabulary of Cicero (*dom.* 39, 104) and Livy (9, 34) meaning: highpriest.

⁵ *Gothofredus*, note g to XVI, 6, 1.

⁶ See the text under II, 5.

while the Apostolic Canons and the Apostolic Constitutions probably were not yet recognized in 377, the year of the above edict.

The "traditio incorrupta" goes back to Stephen, Bishop of Rome from 254 to 257, who had condemned the reiteration of baptism in contrast to Cyprian, Firmilian, and the African councils.⁷ Gothofredus reminds the reader also of the arguments regarding the impossibility of a second baptism by Tertullian, Basil, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Pelagius. It was their reasoning on this subject which had caused "the ordinances of those who approved the apostolic faith without any change of baptism, i.e. the precedents and constitutions of former Emperors."⁸ These constitutions are not handed down to us by Theodosius' code. But the edicts of the later Emperors undoubtedly were based on the same reasons. Accordingly, Gratian stated that the anabaptists "redemta venerabili lavacro corpora reparata morte tabificat" (XVI, 5, 5; Aug. 3, 379). Honorius asserted that the Donatists "infect by the contagion of a profane repetition those once cleansed by God's own gift (XVI, 6, 4; Feb. 12, 405)." Theodosius II warned everyone against the crime of rebaptizing and defiling with profane heretical religions those who had been initiated by the orthodox rite (XVI, 6, 6; March 21, 413). And again Honorius, on Nov. 6, 415 (XVI, 5, 58), compared the grace of baptism given but once with man's birth happening but once.—Correspondingly, the anabaptists' attitude was stigmatized with growing intolerance as "miser error" (XVI, 6, 2; Oct. 17, 377), "institutio nefaria" (XVI, 5, 5; Aug. 3, 379), "devius error," "blandus error," "praevae mentis error," "facinus," "sacriligium ferale" (XVI, 6, 4; Feb. 12, 405), "perversum dogma" (XVI, 6, 5; Feb. 12, 405), "crimen" (XVI, 6, 7; March 29, 413), "nefarium facinus" (XVI, 5, 58; Nov. 6, 415). These were not shallow phrases. We read in Honorius' edict of Feb. 22, 407 (XVI, 5, 40) the remarkable legal conclusion: "He who violates the Catholic discipline commits a public crime because what is done against divine religion is done to the injury of all."

Turning now to the question how the Emperors controlled the doctrine, we possess in Arcadius' constitution of Sept. 3, 395 (XVI, 5, 28) a law which Gothofredus ranks "inter celebrissimas in argumento

⁷ Gothofredus, VI, 215; Cyprian, Ep. LXXIII (Oxford ed. LXXIV); Eusebius, VII, 2 and 3; Augustine, Contra Donatistas V, 23.

⁸ Gothofredus, I. c. 215 f.

de hereticis."⁹ Indeed, its legal definition of "hereticis" involves the elements of true doctrine: "Heretics are those who have been convicted of deviating from the dogma ('tramite')¹⁰ and doctrine ('iudicio') of the Catholic religion on account of an only ('vel') superficial argument." Gothofredus holds it "proculdubio" that this definition was formulated "non sine Nectarii Episcopi Constantinopolitani sententia et consilio."¹¹ It suggests, he continues, three questions: "Quid sit iudicium et trames Catholicae religionis?" "Quid sit deviare ab iis?" "Quid sit vel levi argumento deviare a iudicio et tramite illo?"

The first question is already partly answered by our remarks on the constitution XVI, 6, 2. For the "Apostolorum praecepta" were, no doubt, the most important source of the doctrine of the Catholic religion.¹² However, the term "iudicium" obviously hints at the application of doctrinal propositions when the "ekdoseis kai exegeseis veterum Doctorum Patrumque" and the "legitimorum Conciliorum auctoritas" were needed.¹³

As to the second question, those were considered to deviate from dogma and doctrine who go their peculiar way in the matter of faith, proposing a sentence alien to the Catholic religion, and do pertinaciously insist on their conception; who defend their error and do not look for verity nor are open to any correction. The term "deviare" points to the subjective side, the culpability in the heretic's mind, as already Tertullian had called heresy a "humana praesumptio."¹⁴ All this corresponds to good legal tradition. Still the glossa of Accursius added to "deviare" "pervicaci animositate," i.e. with stubborn animosity, and Alciatus defined the heretic by saying: "pertinaciam esse quae hereticum hominem faciat."

Finally, "vel levi argumento" does not mean: on account of only a slight suspicion, a precipitate judgment; but, of an unfounded proposition or article of faith.¹⁵ To deviate on account of a slight presump-

⁹ Gothofredus, l. c. 160.

¹⁰ Comp. Arcadius' edict of Aug. 7, 395 (XVI, 10, 13), issued scarcely one month before the above edict: "... Igitur universi, qui catholicae religionis dogmate deviare contendunt."

¹¹ Gothofredus, l. c. 160.

¹² Comp. Tertullian, Prescription against Heretics, c. VI: "In the Lord's apostles we possess our authority."

¹³ Gothofredus, l. c. 161.

¹⁴ Tertullian, De jeiunio, c. XI.

¹⁵ Gothofredus, l. c. 161.

tion might be due to a mind unable to discriminate right from wrong; to deviate deliberately by asserting an unfounded article would always aggravate the heretic's guilt.

Arcadius' "celebrissima lex" provided the means for the State's control over the purity of the dogma. It was overshadowed, however, by his father Theodosius' constitution "Cunctos populos," the most important imperial law on Christianity ever given.

Already Gratian, when instructing his Vicar of Africa how to proceed against the anabaptists (XVI, 6, 2; Oct. 17, 377), did not want to prescribe anything different from "the Evangelists' and the Apostles' faith and the incorrupt tradition," "exactly as it has been decreed by the divine law of our forefathers Constantine, Constans, and Valentinian." However, their recognition of the authorized faith can only be inferred from some phrases contained in their laws. Explicitly mentioned there are the "homines Christianae religionis" (XVI, 1, 1), the "ecclesiae catholicae clerici" (XVI, 2, 1), the "sanctissimum catholicae venerabileque concilium" (XVI, 2, 4). The faith as such was drawn up in legislation not earlier than on Feb. 27, 380, when Theodosius made known to the population of Constantinople that "it is our will that all the peoples, ruled by our Grace with right measure, shall turn to that religion which a pious belief declares the Divine Apostle Peter to have handed down to the Romans, and which has been observed since this time up to the present days; which, furthermore, the pontiff Damasus and Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic sanctity, evidently follow, namely that we may believe in accordance with the apostolic discipline and evangelic doctrine in the one deity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost of equal majesty and gracious Trinity."

From the religious point of view there can be no higher praise of this law than that expressed by Baronius and Gothofredus, both calling it an "auream sanctionem, piumque et salutare edictum." However, its significance for the relations between Church and State is not at all sufficiently characterized by these words. We are to realize that it was this edict which legalized the essence of the Christian faith, bringing it under a legal formula and aiming at the exclusion of all possible deviations. It exhibited the official religious standpoint and made the profession of the Catholic faith a public duty. One hundred fifty-four years after its publication, Justinian recognized again the rôle the edict

had played and was still to play by placing it in his code as the first law of the first title: "De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica."

Theodosius tried to enforce the orthodox faith upon his citizens with most severe penalties. "We order that those who follow this law are to use the name of Catholic Christians; the others, however, who judge like demented people, shall sustain infamy on account of their heretical confession; their gathering places shall not be named 'churches,' and they are to be punished first by divine vengeance, then by penalties according to our own decision received from celestial arbitration" (XVI, 1, 2).

"Infamy" was a serious threat. It meant that the loss of honor, inflicted from time immemorial upon those sentenced because of calumny, false accusation, prevarication, and perjury, now came to be applied to all who did not embrace the Catholic faith. The loss of honor consisted in the loss of the right of election as well as of eligibility, in the inability of giving evidence, and of pleading before the courts. Already Constantine had used infamy to proscribe the followers of Arius.¹⁶ And later on, Valentinian and Valens seem to have ordered the Manichaeans to be segregated from any human community "like infamous and dishonorable ones."¹⁷ Theodosius now increased the effects of infamy by depriving the heterodox of the ability to make a will or to receive a bequest by a testament, and by menacing them with the confiscation of their whole fortune. He furthermore enacted restrictions as to their residence. They were forbidden to live in the capitals of the empire and the metropolises of the provinces, and were banished from their vicinity up to the hundredth milestone. Grievous punishments were to follow the violation of banishment.¹⁸ Thus the Emperor added to the old restrictions of civil rights essential limitations of private life.

II. What reasons could have induced Theodosius to demand the confession of the orthodox faith from his citizens and to enforce it by such vigorous measures? Had not tolerance, originating in respect for the innermost conviction of men, been the official state policy in the remote days of the Republic, and, toward Christianity, since the early days of the Empire? No report on Theodosius' motives is handed

¹⁶ *Socrates*, C. H. I, 9.

¹⁷ *Cod. Theod.* XVI, 5, 3 (March 2, 372).

¹⁸ Consult *Th. Mommsen*, *Römisches Strafrecht*, 1899, 604.

down to us. However, on his accession he might have thought over the vicissitudes of the Church since it came into existence, and especially during the short sixty-six years since the edict of Milan. He probably saw clearly that the principles of toleration had proved incompatible with the care for the welfare of an empire dragged to and fro by the most various religious, social, and racial conditions. Solemnly proclaimed by all Emperors of his century, except the sons of Constantine the Great, the principle of toleration had almost always been superseded by repressive measures against the heterodox, and under Constantius II and Valens against the orthodox church. Never thought to be only a temporary measure, toleration had always proved to be insufficient for securing the inner unity the empire so bitterly needed.

(1) During the first two centuries, the traditional policy of toleration was superseded only by local persecutions, favored, sometimes even incited, by the Emperors. It had been officially set aside under Decius (249-251) and Valerian (253-260), when persecutions seemed to further political aims. However, when Valerian was made prisoner by the Persians, an end more dishonorable and ignominious than that of any other Roman Emperor before him,¹⁹ Gallienus (260-268) gave up the apparently dangerous struggle against the new faith and granted the strange religion free exercise.

The tables turned again when Diocletian in 303, aged and tired as he now was, gave way to instigation of his son-in-law Galerius. No less than three edicts aimed at destroying the churches and Scripture, at imprisoning the whole clergy, and at compelling them to worship heathen gods. Finally, in 304, by a fourth edict, he gave the Christians the choice between sacrifice to the Roman gods and death.²⁰ On his abdication, one year later, he left the Christians at the mercy of Galerius (305-311) and his nephew Maximin (305-313). Their reign was stigmatized by the most violent and cruel attempt to oppress and exterminate Christianity. At last, however, both Emperors looked for their salvation by issuing edicts of toleration—Galerius in 311, when slowly dying a tormenting death, Maximin, when defeated by Licinius on April 30, 313.

(2) Constantine and Licinius had joined in Galerius' edict of toleration, probably in order to reconcile the God of the Christians, who

¹⁹ E. Stein, *Geschichte des spätrömischen Reiches*, I, 16.

²⁰ Stein, I. c. 121 f.

"owing to the persecutions had failed to receive their intercessions for the good of the state."²¹ The next year they issued another one,²² and this again, in January 313, was followed by the edict of Milan,²³ granting to the Christians "liberam potestatem sequendi religionem," and, in contrast to the preceding edicts, to the heathen the right to embrace Christianity "citra ullam inquietudinem et molestiam."²⁴

Constantine, in the first years of his reign, used as we have seen, the authority of the State to consolidate the Church, and he consolidated the State through the Church by winning the loyalty of his Christian subjects. Establishing in this way a mutual dependence between Church and State, he laid the foundations for the final victory of Christianity. However, doctrine and discipline of the Catholic Church were not yet stabilized enough to prove the official policy of toleration justified. The Donatists' obstinacy, their resistance against the conclusions of the synods both of Rome in 313 and of Arles in 314, and of the Emperor's decision given at Milan in 316, induced Constantine to enact a series of penal laws against them.²⁵ Was it as a result of the fruitlessness of these laws or because of his trust in the pacifying effect of a conciliatory attitude that he returned, in 321, to his policy of toleration, calling back the exiled clergy, and granting the Donatists all the liberty they wanted? At any rate, wavering did not prove to be wise. "Quid est imperatori cum ecclesia?"—the words with which Donatus in 347 received the imperial commissioners characterize the increase of selfconsciousness and rebellious mind among the Donatists.

In the East, Licinius, in accordance with the official policy of toleration, did not hinder the support which both Eusebius, Bishop of the imperial residence Nicomedia, and Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, conferred upon Arius in his struggle with his bishop Alexander. Later, under the influence of both the bishop of his residence and his wife

²¹ *Smith-Wace*, Dict. of Christ. Biography, I, 638; *Eusebius*, VIII, 17.

²² *Eusebius*, IX, 9.

²³ *V. Schultze*, l. c. III, 251 speaks in accordance with other modern historians, of the falsely so-called Edict of Milan, stating that it was issued by Licinius in Nicomedia, while in Milan the Emperors only agreed as to the outlines. However, Licinius published the edict in Nicomedia when pursuing Maximinus after his victory over him at Tzirallum on April 30. (*Comp. Stein* 141 f.). I assume that the publication of the edict in Nicomedia aimed only at making it known in the territories liberated from Maximinus.

²⁴ *Lactantius*, l. c. 48.

²⁵ See the enumeration of these laws by *Gothofredus*, VI, 116.

Constantia, Licinius seconded the confirmation of Arius' doctrine by two synods, held in Bithynia and in Palestine.²⁶ However, when Alexander succeeded in having Arius excommunicated in 321 by the synod of Alexandria,²⁷ Licinius changed his policy of toleration, restricting in every possible way the clergy's influence on public affairs and removing all Christians from the court, the army, and the administration. Practically outlawed, the Christians now communicated with the mighty ruler in the West. Constantine, anticipating the monocracy he was soon going to win by his decisive victory over Licinius on Sept. 18, 324, did not hesitate to declare already on May 16, 324 the "Tyrant's" orders illegal, even before he had driven him from the throne.²⁸

With the Eastern throne the mortgage of the Arian controversy fell now to Constantine. And in this respect, at least, Constantine seems to have sympathized with the dead "tyrant." For, as Licinius had supported the Arians, so Constantine's policy did not lack measures favorable to the excommunicated presbyter. To be sure, he first sent Arius and his followers into exile, after their excommunication by the Nicene Council. The unity of the Church seemed to be accomplished, reason enough for Constantine to carry out the council's decisions. However, even for him, personal affairs proved to be stronger than the reason of state. It was the influence of both his sister Constantia, Licinius' widow, and his sister-in-law Basilina, perhaps also remorse after the execution of his son Crispus and his wife Fausta, which induced him, in 327, to recall Arius, and to urge the Nicene Council before its final conclusion in Nov., 327, to rehabilitate the Arian clergy. From now on, during the last decade of his reign, Constantine showed an increasingly intolerant attitude toward Athanasius, who, on June 8, 328, was elected successor to Alexander.²⁹ Still in the same year, he answered Athanasius' refusal to admit Arius to the Alexandrian community by banishing him to Treves.

(3) Unpleasant as the changes of the imperial policy of toleration during Constantine's and Licinius' reign had been, all this was only a prelude to what was to follow under Constantine's heirs. No sooner had they, in 337, taken over the government, than Athanasius and Arius

²⁶ *Sozomen*, I, 25; as to the lack of conformity in sources and literature consult *Stein*, 156, note 1.

²⁷ *Comp. B. C. Kidd*, *A History of the Church*, II, 16.

²⁸ *Comp. Cod. Theod.* XV, 14, 1, 2, and 3.

²⁹ *Comp. Kidd*, I. c. 50.

were to become the objectives of a test of power between the rulers in Old-Rome and in New-Rome.

Constantine II, after his arrival in Treves, hurried to permit Athanasius, who still lived there as an exile, to return to his diocese. He evidently went hereby beyond his competence, as Alexandria belonged to the Eastern part of the Empire, ruled by his younger brother Constantius II. Constantius, although an adherent of Arius, restored Athanasius and his followers to their churches. He obviously knew his eldest brother's temper well enough cautiously to avoid any argument with him, who ruled as guardian of Constans, still under age, also over the province of Africa, adjacent to Egypt. Indeed, two years later, Constantine tried to wrest the throne of the Middle Empire from his ward. As a result, near Aquileia, he was ambushed and killed in action. Constans now added Western Europe to his realm. This simplified the situation, but did not diminish the tension. Constans was a reliable adherent of Athanasius' cause, while Constantius, no longer restrained by his oldest brother, now openly showed his sympathy with the Arians. He called the old Eusebius of Nicomedia to the bishopric of Constantinople and convoked a synod at Antioch, which hastened to depose Athanasius again. The Church and Emperor in the West answered this challenge by declaring at a synod in Rome in 340 Athanasius' dethronement to be unwarranted. The following year saw Constantius with the Arian bishops in Antioch again, eager now to condemn the Athanasian party as a whole.³⁰

To end the unpleasant situation, the Emperors finally agreed in holding out the prospect of a second ecumenical council to be convoked in Sardica, just on the line of demarcation between the Western and the Eastern part of the Empire. However, the preparatory councils of the two parties, backed up by the antagonistic Emperor-brothers respectively, brought forth demands so contrasting that no further attempt at reconciliation was made. Constantius continued to support the Arians in the East, and resolved upon the rehabilitation of Athanasius only in 345, when the invasion of Constans' superior forces had become imminent.³¹

However, after Constans was murdered in 350, Constantius no longer curbed his fanatical feelings against the Athanasians. In May,

³⁰ Comp. *Socrates*, II, 8; *Sozomen*, III, 5; *Athanasius*, *De Synodis*, 22 f.

³¹ *Socrates*, II, 22 f.; *Sozomen*, III, 20; *Athanasius*, *Apologia contra Arianos* 51 ff.; *Historia Arianorum*, 21 f.

353, he required Athanasius to appear before the imperial court to defend himself against an accusation of high treason.³² When Athanasius preferred not to follow the invitation, he was condemned by the council of Arles at Constantius' demand. The opposition against such a *condemnatio in absentia* was, however, strong enough to induce the Emperor not to execute the condemnation, but to convoke, in 355, another council in Milan to confirm the first trial. Bishops who resisted the new condemnation or disapproved it afterwards were exiled; Liberius, Bishop of Rome, who interceded for the exile, was arrested and banished to Thrace; his First Deacon, Felix, an Arian and *persona grata* to the Emperor, was installed in his stead.³³

The concluding chapter of Constantius' church policy, however, was written, from 357 to 359, in Sirmium, where the radical wing of the Arians won the first round in the Fall of 357 at the second Sirmian council, when the 'homoiousios' was eliminated. Its restoration by the third synod, in June 358, satisfied the Semi-Arians, but provoked the opposition of the Homoeans, who were willing to acknowledge only Christ's likeness in general, not to speak of the Anomoeans, who asserted Christ to be unlike the Father in all things. Constantius now tried out a compromise, the so-called Fourth Sirmian Creed of May 359. Stating Christ's being only "homoios," it defined this term by adding the words "in every respect according to the Scripture." No doubt this creed conceded the Semi-Arians less than they demanded and enforced on the Homoeans more than they were willing to admit. Thus, Constantius, in sympathy with the radicals, renounced the above definition and enforced, still in 359, the Homoean standpoint on the Catholic bishops in the West, summoned in Rimini, and on the Arian bishops in the East, convoked in Seleucia.³⁴ Dissenters were banished; propositions concerning privileges of the churches and the clergy, made by the Council of Rimini, were denounced as extravagant and against all "quod nostra videtur dudum sanctio reppulisse."³⁵

(4) The interlude of Julian's attempt at turning the clock backward to paganism demanded religious laws opposite to those of the

³² Comp. *Athanasius*, *Apologia ad Constantium*, 6-13.

³³ *Socrates*, II, 36; *Sozomen*, IV, 9 ff.; *Athanasius*, *Historia Arianorum*, 31 ff.; Constantius's letter to Felix of Dec. 6, 357, *Cod. Theod.* XVI, 2, 14.

³⁴ The situation still needs further investigation. Often, Constantius is thought to have supported the Semi-Arians; comp. *Schaff*, in *Enc. Rel. Knowledge* I, 280. Most elaborate *Kidd*, I. c. chap. V and VI.

³⁵ See *Cod. Theod.* XVI, 2, 16.

preceding periods. His edict of toleration, involving the restitution of the treasures to the temples, the withdrawal of the privileges granted since 313 to the Christian clergy, and their transfer to the pagan priests⁸⁶ was discredited by the Emperor's indifference toward occasional outrages against Christians both by public functionaries and the pagan mob, while its being put into effect by the recall of all the exiled clergy, orthodox as well as heterodox, caused considerable turmoil, probably in accordance with Julian's intentions.

(5) At any rate, his successor Jovianus made the best of it by professing universal toleration, comprehending all Christian groups.⁸⁷ His early death, however, opened the door for a new religious dissension under the condominium (364-375) of the Emperor-brothers Valentinian I and Valens, a striking parallel to the situation during the reign of Constans and Constantius. Valentinian, Emperor in the West, adhered to the Nicene Creed, while Valens in the East favored Arianism in its radical form.

Valentinian's devotion to the orthodox church might seem questionable if we consider that he emphasized his tolerance, attested, as he said in his edict of May 29, 371 (IX, 16, 9), by the "laws proclaimed by me at the beginning of my reign, granting a free right of worship to everyone as he has conceived in his heart." However, to show tolerance was certainly a sound policy, as his reign began only eight months after Julian's death, so that he had to take into account the changes in the nation's life caused by Julian's revival of paganism. His partisanship in the quarrel about the Roman see, reviving after Liberius' death on Sept. 24, 366, bears evidence, on the other hand, to his orthodox conviction. He banished Ursinus, whom Liberius' followers had elected and ordained, and, at the end of 367, intrusted the spiritual power over all churches of Rome to the presbyter Damasus who was to play a most important rôle in the consolidation of the orthodox faith under Theodosius the Great. I assume that Valentinian not only relied upon Damasus' dependability, but also distrusted Ursinus on account of Liberius' former, even though enforced, consent to Athanasius' condemnation.

Simultaneously, Valens, under the influence of Eudoxius, since 360 Bishop of Constantinople, resumed the church policy of Constantius II.

⁸⁶ *Sozomen*, V, 3; *Juliani* epist. 47, 54, 114; comp. *Kidd*, I. c. 188.

⁸⁷ Comp. *Schaff*, I. c. 60; *Robertson*, I. c. 354; *Kidd*, I. c. 219.

Licensing only those "who under cover of the Christian name . . . preached doctrines contrary to those of the Gospel,"³⁸ he exiled Athanasius anew together with the orthodox bishops reinstated by Julian. Athanasius, obviously under the pressure of public opinion, was recalled at the beginning of 366. But it was his Arian opponent Lucius who, after Athanasius' death on May 2, 373, was placed by the government in the episcopal chair of Alexandria, while Peter, chosen by Athanasius himself as his successor, was cast into prison.³⁹ Moreover, the Emperor ordered the governor of Egypt to expel not only the followers of Athanasius but all such as were obnoxious to Lucius.⁴⁰

(6) However, when after Valentinian's death on Nov. 17, 375, his energetic son Gratian took over the government, the balance shifted perceptibly in favor of the orthodox side. His edict of toleration, excluding only the Eunomians, Photinians, and Manichaeans,⁴¹ was out-ruled first, on April 22, 376,⁴² by the renewal of his father's interdict of the Donatist Church (XVI, 5, 4). Then he declared obligatory the conclusion of the Council of Sardica, according to which the Roman bishop, and a synod called by him, possess the appellate jurisdiction over the whole Church of Christ. Finally, on Aug. 3, 379, he forbade any kind of Christian worship not in line with the Catholic observance, revoking implicitly his recent edict of toleration: "Denique antiquato rescripto quod apud Sirmium nuper emersit, ea tantum super Catholica observatione permaneant, quae perennis recordationis pater noster et nos ipsi victura in aeternum atque numerosa iussone mandavimus" (XVI, 5, 5).

III. Such was the situation when, on Jan. 19, 379, Theodosius was nominated by Gratian as successor to Valens. As Emperor in the East he had to take over an inheritance ruled for the last forty years by protectors of Arianism. In his residence, Constantinople, he had to cope with constant troubles caused by the division of its population into all possible sects.⁴³ Hence, one year and one month after his accession

³⁸ Theodoret, C. H. IV, 21.

³⁹ More about him under III.

⁴⁰ Socrates, IV, 22; Sozomen, VI, 19.

⁴¹ Socrates, V, 2; Sozomen, VII, 1.

⁴² XVI, 5, 4 is dated: "X Kal. Mai." This means: April 22, not May 1, as Smith-Wace, l. c. II, 725 read.

⁴³ Sozomen, VII, 4.

he abandoned the traditional policy of toleration by issuing, on Feb. 27, 380, the constitution "Cunctos populos" (cf. above, end of I).

The impression that by this edict Theodosius made himself "Supreme Governor" of the Eastern church will be confirmed by some reflection upon two other fundamental constitutions, given by Theodosius on Jan. 10, 381 (XVI, 5, 6), and on July 30, 381 (XVI, 1, 3). First, however, we will try to find out the spiritual authors to whom 'Cunctos populos,' i.e. the legalization of the orthodox faith, might be traced back.

The edict was issued in Thessalonica, and it was in the same year and the same city that Theodosius was baptized and confirmed by its bishop Acholius.⁴⁴ Ambrosius called him "sanctum virum," "murum fidei, gratiae et sanctitatis."⁴⁵ Sozomen and Basil confirmed this judgment.⁴⁶ No doubt, Theodosius not only joined them in their appreciation, but gladly accepted him "as the best 'synergon' (collaborator) in stabilizing the Catholic faith." Thus, Acholius obviously was the "suasor," even "rogator" of the famous constitution.⁴⁷

Acholius as adviser and even proposer of the edict relied upon the Cappadocian fathers, especially Basil the Great, who had in numerous passages stressed the co-equality of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity, and had always traced the dogma of the Trinity to the Apostolic and Evangelic doctrine. Furthermore, Irenaeus had already recommended the authorization of the Creed by the commemoration of the foundation of the Roman Church by the "most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul."⁴⁸ Besides, there was the contemporaneous literature, Athanasius', Ambrosius', and Jerome's epistles, in which Damasus, the Bishop of Rome, and Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, were praised for having pronounced again and again the very truth. They were living examples of the preservation of the orthodox faith. Thus, Theodosius referred to "pontificem Damasum . . . et Petrum Alexandriae episcopum virum apostolicae sanctitatis" as the living authorities.

Furthermore, the legalized formula: "ut secundum apostolicam

⁴⁴ *Socrates*, V, 6; *Sozomen*, VII, 4.

⁴⁵ *Ambrosius*, *Operarum* tom. V, ep. 22.

⁴⁶ *Sozomen*, VII, 3: "endowed with every virtue of the priesthood"; *Basil*, ep. 165: "With all the grace of the Spirit."

⁴⁷ *Gothofredus*, VI, 6 and 9; "rogator" is obviously used in remembrance of the ancient distinction between "lex rogata" and "lex data."

⁴⁸ *Irenaeus* adversus Haereses, III, 3.

disciplinam evangelicamque doctrinam . . . credamus" was obviously an allusion to the different origin of the sees of Rome and Alexandria, the one founded by the Apostle Peter, the other by the Evangelist Marcus; perhaps also an allusion to the different significance the sees had gained during the last two centuries, Rome the forge of discipline, Alexandria the center of doctrinal controversies.

The constitution "*Cunctos populos*" was to legalize the Nicene Creed. And yet, Theodosius did not refer to it. Gothofredus assumes that he did not want to hurt the heretics' feelings, "because the Nicene faith was at that time most detested by the heretics."⁴⁹ However, at the beginning of the following year, on Jan. 10, 381, he promulgated another edict, placed in the *Codex Theodosianus* among the constitutions "*De Haereticis*" (XVI, 5, 6), in the *Codex Justinianus* immediately after the constitution "*Cunctos populos*" (I, 1, 2). By this edict Theodosius plainly ordered that the Nicene faith, handed down from ancient times, should remain unchanged as the standard. As to the determination, as to who should be accepted as affirmer of the Nicene faith and as a true worshipper of the Catholic religion, Gothofredus points to the striking resemblance of Theodosius' formula in this constitution with that of the Council of Constantinople as reported by Gregory of Nyssa, its authorized secretary:

C. Th. XVI, 5, 6

. . . qui omnipotentem deum et Christum filium dei uno nomine confitetur, deum de deo, lumen ex lumine: qui spiritum sanctum, quem ex summo rerum parente speramus et accipimus, negando non violat; apud quem intemperate fidei sensu viget incorruptae trinitatis indivisa substantia, quae Graeci adsertione verbi ousia recte credentibus dicitur.

Gregory's record

Credimus in unum deum patrem omnipotentem et in unum dominum Iesum Christum, unigenitum dei filium, deum ex deo, lumen ex lumine, deum verum ex deo vero: et in spiritum sanctum dominum unificantem, ex patre procedentem, cum patre et filio adorandum et conglorificandum, qui locutus est per prophetas.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Gothofredus, VI, 6.

⁵⁰ The Greek wording of Gregory's report can be found in Gothofredus, I. c. 132; of Theodosius' law in *Cod. Justinianus* I, 1, 2, ed. Mommsen.

This resemblance induced Gothofredus to conjecture that Theodosius' constitution was issued after the conclusion of the council, that subsequently its subscript was to be read "Dat. IV. Id. Jun.," instead of "Dat. IV. Id. Jan." Gothofredus based his conjecture besides on the parallelism of Theodosius' prohibition of the Photiniani, Ariani, and Eunomiani to the council's prohibiting these sects in the same sequence.⁵¹

Nevertheless, I do not think Gothofredus' conjecture is justified. Not that I overestimate the fact that Mommsen in his edition of the code does not even mention the possibility of a slip of the pen concerning the dating. But, if Theodosius had issued his constitution after, and with regard to, the council's conclusion, he would, in my opinion, not have used an incomparably more indefinite phrase regarding the Holy Spirit than the council did. This all the more since he had called the council precisely to decide on heretical doctrines concerning His nature.

Moreover, Theodosius' formula goes beyond the council's in facing the problem of the Holy Trinity. That such an addition to the Creed was taken into consideration by the council may be concluded from the synodical letter to Damasus and the other bishops of the West, none of whom had attended the council: "We are to believe in the one Godhead, and in the power and substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, in their equal dignity and eternal government, appearing in three perfect hypostases or three perfect persons."⁵² But the council restricted itself on this informative epistle, probably holding the whole problem with its distinction between ousia and hypostasis not yet ripe enough to be the objective of dogmatic formulation.

All this speaks against Gothofredus' conjecture. Likewise, however, the fact that Theodosius, on July 30, 381, i.e. immediately after the council's conclusion, issued his third fundamental edict on the Catholic faith and the Holy Trinity, this time remaining within the boundaries drawn by the council: "We order that all churches are to be handed over to the bishops who confess that the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost are of one majesty and power, and of the same glory and one splendor, and who do not cause any discord by profane division,

⁵¹ Comp. XVI, 5, 6, third sentence, and *Gothofredus* l. c.

⁵² Comp. *Gothofredus*, l. c. 133.

but uphold the order of the persons of the Trinity and the unity of the Godhead" (XVI, 1, 3).

By issuing this edict, Theodosius went beyond the petition of the synod, expressed in its letter to him: "Wherefore we beseech your Piety that the decree of the Synod may be ratified, and that, as you have honored the Church by your letter of citation, so you should set your seal to the conclusion of what has been decreed." The way Theodosius complied with this request is again very significant as to the relations of the State to the Church. For by canon II the council had fixed the bounds of administration of the Eastern dioceses. The constitution of July 30, written obviously to implement canon II, furnishes evidence of the Emperor's prerogative to choose as bishops the priests he held to be exemplary for their piety. It was his responsibility that the Eastern sees should be administered in the right spirit.

Furthermore, canon III had ranked the bishopric of Constantinople immediately behind Rome. The only reason, and a very shallow one, viz. "because Constantinople is New Rome," is eloquent proof that paying homage to the Emperor's residence seemed to be more important than upholding the tradition of esteem for the venerable see of Alexandria. Theodosius did not contradict this. Rather, he confirmed the new order of precedence by his constitution of July 30, naming Nectarius, the Praetor of Constantinople, "a man of noble birth,"⁵³ but still unbaptized and of unknown qualities, Bishop of Constantinople to rank before Timotheus, the Bishop of Alexandria. The allusion in his constitution of Feb. 27, 380 (XVI, 1, 2) to the almost equal significance of the sees of Rome and Alexandria was forgotten.

If not for this reason, at any rate in respect to what was to happen nine years later in Thessalonica, the Synod of Constantinople certainly was wise when praying⁵⁴ that God would show favor to the world by preserving Theodosius as "verily the most God-fearing and God-blessed King."

⁵³ *Theodoret*, V, 8.

⁵⁴ Comp. the conclusion of the synodical letter to the Emperor.

"HUMAN DESTINY"

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The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. II. *Human Destiny.* By Reinhold Niebuhr.
New York: Scribners, 1943, pp. xiv + 329. \$2.75.

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr occupies a unique place in American theology. His influence in Great Britain is regarded by some as greater comparatively than in this country. It is certainly more widely dispersed in Britain, being confined to no one school either within or without the Church of England. In this country Niebuhr is the foremost Christian apologist from the standpoint of effect upon intellectuals in and out of the universities. He is also the most influential American exponent of what is often labelled neo-orthodoxy. It is probable that within the Episcopal Church insufficient attention has been paid to this revival. Protestantism, far from being dead, has its own sources of vitality, and a hundred years after the Catholic revival they are being tapped again.

The first volume of Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures appeared in 1941 and was reviewed in the *ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW* of April, 1942. It was there stated that with the arrival of Volume II, entitled *Human Destiny*, we should have an opportunity to estimate Professor Niebuhr not merely as analyst and prophet but as constructive theologian. It is with such an estimate, so far as it can be made within the space assigned us, that we shall be concerned in this review.

The volume begins with a discussion of "Human Destiny and History." This actually would be a more accurate description of what follows in the nine succeeding chapters than the more general "Human Destiny." After treating the relation of Messianism and history in general terms, the author considers in three chapters the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith as disclosed in the New Testament in their meaning for the historical life of man. In this section Niebuhr appears as an acute and profound Biblical theologian. Particularly memorable is the treatment in this connection of the doctrine of the atonement.

The next three chapters (V, VI, VIII) are devoted to human destiny as viewed respectively by Catholicism, the Renaissance, and the Reformation. The climax of this section is a proposed synthesis of the Reformation and the Renaissance. This discussion is perhaps the closest thing to a deliberate and considered eirenicon that is to be found in Niebuhr's writings. It reveals him as less polemical and more pacific in his attitude to liberalism than in the volume *Human Nature* or the works preceding it.

Chapters VIII and IX deal respectively with the subjects Truth and Tolerance, and the Kingdom of God and the Struggle for Justice. They disclose a mature Niebuhr at his dialectical best. The last chapter is entitled "The End of History" and is in some respects the most interesting in the book. In it the author grapples with the difficult theme of Christian Eschatology and partially anticipates the criticism that the title of the volume is misleading, since it is so predominantly taken up with historical human destiny and so little with the issues of ultimate or eternal destiny.

Now what shall we say of Niebuhr the constructive theologian, on the basis of this volume? The tentative answer which, greatly daring, we shall essay, will be put under distinct heads for the sake of brevity.

1. Niebuhr has probably come closer in this book to making himself clear and understandable than in any previous writing. His position takes on more systematic lines and is revealed, I believe, as more nearly orthodox than in any other work. This is especially true of his doctrine of the atonement. I even venture to think that the position which he takes up in this connection requires the Nicene and Chalcedonian Confessions for its validation and logical elaboration. This ascertain formerly would have made Dr. Niebuhr writhe and might still do so. He tends to regard these confessions as essentially metaphysical, which is an error. They do not, however, involve what at times his own statements seem to suggest, the complete repudiation of philosophy. They embody rather an anti-metaphysical metaphysic, or an anti-scholastic scholasticism. But one may ask whether this is not exactly what Niebuhrism comes to. One cannot consistently make assertions that bristle with metaphysics and at the same time eschew all ontology.

2. Niebuhr discloses himself in *Human Destiny* definitely and perhaps finally as a marginal Christian thinker or dialectician rather than

a systematic theologian. Like Kierkegaard, or Barth in his first period, he is a theologian for theologians rather than a constructive or systematic builder. Only what these thinkers did for the individual, existentially regarded, Niebuhr has done for man in society, historical man, also existentially regarded. This alone is a notable contribution and sufficient justification for any one man. It does not alter the conclusion that Niebuhr is one-sided even as a Biblical theologian. This is seen if we look at him on the Incarnation and Christology, a subject already mentioned. It is true even of his teaching on the atonement, one of his strongest points. It is still more clear if we interrogate the book *Human Destiny* on the subject of the Church. Let us look a little more closely at these two subjects, the Atonement and the Church.

3. For Niebuhr the heart of the atonement is the reconciliation of the Divine justice or wrath with the Divine mercy. On this theme he writes superbly. Nothing more profound and more Christian has been said on this aspect of the atonement in our generation. In general he comes here in the Reformed tradition, which from Luther to Grotius is one phase of the Latin or Western approach to this great doctrine. God for this approach is in some mysterious but real way the point of impact of the work of Christ. It always involves a paradoxical view of God. Niebuhr is as clear as a bell on this all-important point. There is however a strong suggestion in his treatment that reconciliation is more a matter of revelation to man than a cosmic act. Of the idea that the atonement includes objective redemption from sin, Satan, and death, there is hardly a trace. Aulén is cited only once (apparently, and this is not recorded in the index) and then significantly the point referred to is the element common to the classic and Latin theories, namely, that God is both the propitiator and the propitiated (see p. 56). The main idea brought forward by Aulén that for the Fathers as for the New Testament the active, cosmic powers of evil are overthrown, is entirely ignored. Further the Resurrection is not brought into the picture, and it seems fair to say that there is little in Niebuhr of the sense of *Christus Victor*, Christ the Victorious Saviour and risen Lord, God and man in one Person. This brings us back to the whole question of Niebuhr's view of the Incarnation. He comes right up to the threshold of this doctrine. Implicitly, I believe, he holds it. But he shies away from it at the last moment, in a way that St. Paul and St. John at least do not.

4. The most notable and singular omission in *Human Destiny* is any doctrine of the Church. I make such a statement with hesitation; but it seems to be true. This is the more striking in that Niebuhr is so ardent a Paulinist. Yet of the relation of the Body of Christ and human destiny there is no discussion. Likewise the Sacraments are entirely ignored. The explanation may lie in part in the anti-Catholic tenor of his thinking and still more his feeling. This strain is deep in Niebuhr. He is mortally afraid of ecclesiastical pretension, and no doubt with reason. But what of the Epistle to the Ephesians? Is it possible to treat of human destiny from a profoundly Christian angle and ignore it? It would be interesting to hear Niebuhr himself on this point. It is germane to say with emphasis that his theology as it stands is in marked contrast from this angle with the New Testament, the central Christian tradition, and Luther and Calvin, both of whom were in a real sense high churchmen and high sacramentarians.

In conclusion, I wish to reassert that, regardless of the criticisms that may validly be made of it, *Human Destiny* is a work of the first importance. With its running mate *Human Nature*, it represents a landmark in the history of American and possibly of Ecumenical theology. It is a book that may conceivably make history. It comes out of the furnace of historical complexity and tragedy which is our time. It looks beyond the present agony to new possibilities and fulfilments, and at the same time warns of the limitations and bounds of all historical achievement. In attempting to review critically such a work, I cannot but take to myself Shaw's remark about teachers: "Those that can, do; those that can't, teach" (or criticise).

BOOK REVIEWS

How Do We Know God? By Richard Kroner. New York: Harpers, 1943, pp. xii + 134. \$1.75.

In the discussion of the problem forming the title of this volume, Professor Kroner takes his start from the ancient problem of faith and reason. Knowledge through reason is taken to mean the modern natural and social sciences (including mathematics) and also philosophy and natural theology. He shows that scientific knowledge is always specialized, partial and hence incapable of comprehending the object of faith. This inadequacy of modern scientific method to supply or supplant religious knowledge is shown by a consideration of recent attempts to construct a scientific theology based on empirical knowledge. Finally, he rules out philosophy and natural theology, since they give only an abstract metaphysical concept rather than the living God of Christianity. The two concluding lectures give the author's reconciliation between dogmatism and metaphysics in terms of speculative religious experience and mystical fellowship. These are the results of an "inspired imagination" (does he mean divine grace?) which is the only means whereby we finite men can attain to a knowledge of the supreme spirit. The reconciliation between our finite, temporal nature and God's infinite, eternal nature finds its consummation in the Person of Christ, where history is transcended and overcome in the midst of history.

Professor Kroner attacks the problem at hand with a spirit of sincerity and faith, and his treatment of it gives a persuasive defense of faith for the modern mind. But his analysis of the problem is carried out within the limitations of modern epistemology, and to that extent it suffers. Two examples must suffice to illustrate this point. In the first place, the terms *subjective* and *objective* are used only in the context of modern concepts of knowledge, with the result that "rational" knowledge alone is objective while knowledge by faith is subjective: "... the proposition: 'Christ is the Saviour' cannot be true if none exists who believes in its truth." This could easily afford an opening for a dangerous sophistry. Secondly, in discussing rational theology, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel are the main figures mentioned. Thus, under the term theology, only natural theology seems to be meant. Theology proper, a science based on principles of revelation and guided toward its conclusions by the light of faith, as it was developed from the early Church fathers through the time of Augustine and the middle ages, is scarcely mentioned. If Professor Kroner had made use of such treatments of the problem of faith and reason as Augustine's *On the Free Will*, Bonaventura's *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, or Aquinas' treatises on the theological virtues and the relation to them of the intellectual virtues, he could have given us a much clearer understanding of how the human intellect can enter into the service of faith—not as a substitute for faith, but as a way of "cooperating positively" with divine grace, through which alone we are granted a saving knowledge of God.

LEWIS M. HAMMOND.

St. John's College

New Eyes for Invisibles. By Rufus M. Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1943, pp. xii + 185. \$2.00.

One opens a book by Rufus Jones with hope of sure refreshment. In his thinking, as in his personal witness, he belongs in the great tradition which has given us the Journals of Fox and of Woolman, and other treasures. The reader of *New Eyes for Invisibles* will not be disappointed. The book is small and simple,—a companion, we are told, to four previous volumes. It contains a series of meditations, which "might or might not evolve into sermons,"—a modest phrase rightly implying welcome brevity. "Each one," continues the preface, "deals with some great issue of life." These issues are not practical, even though the chapters pass from "Inward Ho!" to "Outward Ho!" and sometimes touch on a topic like education; they are all related to the theme suggested by the title, the "New Eyes," never more needed than today, never more possible of attainment. The book has delightful variety of illustration from "the visible" however, drawn from science, art, literature and above all from the Scriptures. These last add cogency to the author's memories of the part played by the Bible in the education of youth a generation ago, when "it was built into our mental fibre to go no more out forever," and to his plea for increasing use of the Book with its inexhaustible riches in education today. Which of us, clergy or laity, have apposite phrases from Habakkuk, Obadiah, Zephaniah, at our pen's end today? "He knoweth what is in the dark"; "possessing your possessions" . . . how pregnant, how pertinent, today!

The attitude is one always welcome and not always found among mystics, for it begins by complaining that St. Paul ought never to have told us not to look at the things that are seen. The author is delicately sensitive to every hint of the super-sensuous which the senses offer; few moderns help us more to gain what is surely 'one of the greatest blessings life can offer,—power to see the eternal in the midst of time.' A sentence of George Macdonald's might serve as text: "In wonder begins the soul of man; in wonder it ends; and investigation fills up the interspace." For the imagination is invoked as a great tool of the spirit, and the key-note is the recurrent use in the Bible of the word "Behold!" Wonder, expectancy, incertitude,—they may lead to shuddering dread, as they do today; but they may also be the gate of vision. "Our Christianity was born in the climate of crisis. It was the discovery of the leap of Divine Emergence just when man had come to the dead end of his own powers."

"These supreme disasters which are shaking the foundations of our civilization are due in large measure to the fact that we have been neglecting ultimate realities and have been busy with secondary concerns." . . . Yes, that is what all Christian thinkers are saying. But few bring us back as effectively as Rufus Jones to "the abysmal inner life," "deeper than thinking or willing" where faith is to be found. His buoyant and solemn optimism need not be distrusted; it springs from the inward assurance of one who has "been there." It is in sharp contrast to the cry of anguish rising today from many Christian hearts. That cry too has its power to quicken us. Centring again and again in criticism of our pleasant conventional "telluric" Christianity, it reminds us of the comforting fact that the sharpest criticism has always come from those most loyal to the historic Church; witness Dante's St. Peter, at whose words all Paradise flushes with angry shame; witness today Middleton Murry, witness the "Nicodemus" of *Midnight Hour*, witness our own Bernard Iddings Bell. Perhaps the most devastating and condensed expression of this anguish is found in D. M. Mackinnon's contribution to that 1941 *Malvern* volume which is doing so much to educate our communion: "The Gethsemane of the prophetic spirit is undoubtedly the place where he sees the necessity of the visible Church. . . . 'Father, if it be possible let this Church pass

from me.'” Dr. Mackinnon does not forget that this was a prayer which could not be answered. Yet it is consoling to turn from this vital and salutary anguish, to the illumined and untroubled witness of those whose contacts with the Invisible have been authentic and direct. This is not a book of exposition, it is a book of testimony. It mounts to the last two chapters, “Direct Experience,” “How the Mystic Knows.” Here the author presents the essence of evidence to the Unseen offered by those great mystics whose intimacy he shares to a rare degree,—Plotinus, St. Teresa, Eckhart,—not forgetting his beloved Quakers, and including a young man in an English prison cell.

We of the Anglican tradition may find certain emphases, supplied by a more Catholic approach to religion, lacking in this book. It may seem to us that outward separation from the continuity of the historic Church, while certainly offering relief in a way, entails greater loss. Especially fundamental may seem the comparative absence of that recognition of Sin so stressed today by men of faith like Reinhold Niebuhr and William Temple, not to speak of theologians on the Continent. The book breathes joyous assurance that we are made in the Divine Image; it seems less aware that we have so defaced that Image that only by the Cross can it be restored. But it is well for us to remember that none of us who stress the full implications of this fact are equalling the Quakers in practical ministries to the world's sore need. They have a right to challenge us. “Is the Bride, the Church of Christ, today really saying ‘Come,’ so that the world hears it and heeds it? I am afraid the answer is No,” says Rufus Jones. And again: “The most distinctive thing about Christianity is that . . . it is essentially set toward the highway of the future.” “If the great historic Churches are not ready to take this forward step and become the purveyors of vital faith and vision to the world in its agonies today, is it not possible for the little religious body, the Society of Friends, to have a fresh birth of life and to show the way to a triumphant and conquering faith? Friends did it once.”

Let us give thanks for all victories of the Spirit of Christ, wherever shown.

VIDA D. SCUDDER.

Wellesley, Mass.

Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud. By Louis M. Epstein. Harvard University Press, 1942, pp. x + 362. \$3.50.

This is a technical treatise on the following subjects: polygamy, concubinage, levirate, intermarriage, incest (including prohibited degrees), and other marriage prohibitions. The author surveys the whole history of Jewish marriage legislation, from primitive times down to the present day. Most of his sources are of course rabbinic and, as a whole, not readily accessible to Christian readers. Hence the great importance of this work, not only for Jewish scholars but also for Christian.

The author recognizes at the beginning that there is a tradition of polygamy among the Jews and he disposes of the counter theory that according to the Bible the Hebrews were originally monogamous and that only under the influence of foreign nations was there any deviation from this standard. On the contrary, it is much more likely that “the Jewish law-giver finding polygamy at the root of Hebrew life did not or could not eradicate it by outright prohibition, but sought to eliminate it gradually by such laws as the required purification after contact with a woman, or the command to treat all wives alike, or the prohibition against castration. The preacher taught monogamy by the story of creation, by the censure he offered Solomon for his plural marriages, by prophetic utterances in favor of monogamy, and by subtle apologies for

the polygamy of some prominent biblical personalities" (pp. 5, 6). A polygamous society certainly permits the existence of monogamous families, while a monogamous ruling generally excludes polygamy altogether. This formula (p. 6) is a much more satisfactory one and explains more of the Old Testament data than the alternative one of original monogamy.

With this background it is clear that the later legislation, not only in the Old Testament but in later Judaism, reflects a continuous pressure in the direction of a higher and nobler conception of marriage and its duties. True, the Talmud, at least in theory, assumes polygamy (p. 18); it is also true that from time to time there were those who undertook to revive polygamy, even after it had come to be frowned upon, usually in areas still in contact with the Orient, and especially with Islam. Nevertheless, the successive restraints that were placed upon polygamy, the difficulties put in the way of it, sometimes by clever exegesis as by the Zadokites or the Karaites (who insisted that the law forbidding a man to marry two sisters really meant any two women, with the result that they made the Bible itself prohibit polygamy)—all this shows the steady development of the Jewish conception of monogamy.

A similar development can be traced in the law and custom regarding concubines—all the way from the old Oriental practice, as old as the Code of Hammurabi about 2100 B.C., down into Hellenistic times. The concubine was really one of several kinds of wife: queen-wife, lawful wife, concubine, captive-wife, slave-wife, and slave-girl (p. 35). When history dawns, concubinage is already found as part of the Hebrew family life. It was no doubt centuries older, perhaps even millennia older than the beginnings of Hebrew history. As a matter of fact, the concubine was a recognized figure in the Oriental family. She had certain rights and privileges quite superior to those of the slave-wife or the captive-wife. She was married to her lord by a ceremony approximating that of full marriage (p. 44), and in Assyrian law she could be raised to wife-hood by the pronouncement of the formula, "She is my wife"—which means, of course, as the author notes, that as a concubine she is not a "wife" technically. All this is part of the background of the Old Testament, and the laws relating to marriage, slavery, etc., in the Old Testament must be understood against this background.

"The cultural development of the Hebrew people during the biblical period tended to make an end to the whole concept of inferior and superior wives or more legitimate and less legitimate children. We have said that concubinage broke down with the demolition of the patriarchal family structure. The biblical ideal of individual and family life helped to break down the patriarchal foundations. The biblical tendency was to give more recognition to the individual, more independence to the child, more personal rights to the slave. The powers of the patriarch were shorn in respect to dictating the manner of succession. The Jewish slave was only a hireling, not a slave. Kinship came to mean natural blood ties rather than legal ties with the family. Marriage became a legally sanctioned union rather than a socially stratified position against a family background. Hence all sons were sons and all marriages were marriages. And if the law did step in to deprive a son of sonship or to declare a marriage invalid, this was not a matter of gradation; it rendered the son no son and the marriage no marriage. Degrees came to an end, and that was the end of concubinage in all its forms, pilegesh, captive-wife, or slave-wife" (pp. 61-62).

The picture we gain is one of gradually increasing idealism. How much of it was due to contact with the West rather than with the East, how much of it was the infiltration of Christian ideas the author does not say. But it is obvious that a steady advance in the direction of pure and complete monogamy has been made through the centuries.

Chapter three deals with levirate marriage and is a very technical discussion of the subject from the point of view of Jewish law. It is surprising that the author nowhere refers to the researches of Professor Millar Burrows, either his books or his articles. Christian scholars are of course familiar with these. What Epstein provides in compensation is a great array of material from Jewish sources, which is a valuable addition to our material on the subject. The chapter on incest contains two diagrams, one setting forth the prohibitory degrees within the male line, the other the female. These show at a glance the Jewish prohibitions. There is a good register of foreign names and a bibliography.

The Jewish marriage laws have grown up out of not merely centuries but even milleniums of social experience, in the East and in the West. On the whole they are humane—more humane, in fact, than some of the Christian laws. Perhaps this is one result of Jewish law having to find itself a basis in the exegesis of an ancient and on the whole primitive code, where the Christian laws have undertaken to interpret a prophetic ideal (indissolubility) as a code of law. The present discussion of the proposed marriage canon in the Episcopal Church makes all the more significant for us such a treatise as the one Dr. Epstein has written.

FREDERICK C. GRANT.

Union Theological Seminary

The Life and Writings of Saint Ildefonsus of Toledo. By Sister Athanasius Braegelmann. The Catholic University of America Studies in Mediaeval History, New Series, Vol. IV. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1942, pp. 191.

This dissertation, the fourth in a new series so far devoted entirely to the religious history of Visigothic Spain, is a careful compilation and exposition of all that is known of its subject, and is done with painstaking thoroughness, extensive documentation and little originality. But the subject itself is not overly exciting, if one may judge of Ildefonsus' mentality by his addition to Isidore's eulogy of Pope Gregory the Great. "Gregory," he says, "excelled Anthony in holiness, Cyprian in eloquence, and Augustine in wisdom!"

It is undoubtedly a great convenience for the future historian of the glorious period of Spanish Church history to have all of this information about Ildefonsus arranged and catalogued in one place; but the real problems are not tackled. We are given instead a digest of learned opinion. The differences in style of the four works acknowledged as genuine makes difficult any solution of the authenticity of the sermons attributed to Ildefonsus or of his contribution to the Mozarabic rite. No attempt, however, is made in this thesis to advance beyond the present stage of research—though some additions are made to the list of sources of his *De cognitione baptismi*. In view of the composite character of this liturgical work (like Isidore's *De ecclesiasticis officiis*), one might have expected a more searching criticism of possible sources behind Ildefonsus' most original treatise, the *De virginitate beatae Mariae*. This latter work, the author considers to have been intended for Christian edification, and not so much as apology against the Jews. Would Ildefonsus have agreed to this judgment?

Sometimes the author does not make herself clear as to which one of competing learned opinions she prefers. For example, in Ildefonsus' treatment of the conferring of chrism and the imposition of hands upon those baptized by heretics, does she believe this rite to be absolution or confirmation? Also it is not plain why there were no church councils held during Ildefonsus' pontificate. Does she think it due to strained

relations between the king and the bishops, or not? Perhaps inconclusiveness in these points is after all the wisest position.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Episcopal Theological School

Walter Rauschenbusch. By Dores Robinson Sharpe. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. xvi + 463. \$2.75.

A great man is fortunate to have a biographer who is deeply loyal to him, intelligently sympathetic, restrained and objective. Walter Rauschenbusch was a great man and Dr. Sharpe has proved himself a worthy biographer.

One wishes that every American Protestant, at least, would read this book and that for many reasons. First, there is the quiet religious power of Rauschenbusch himself which shines out of the book without being labored or too eulogized by the biographer. Second, a great segment of American Christianity and its institutions cannot be understood without knowing the life and thought of the man who more than any other helped to turn the spirit of American Christianity to social transformation. Third, every Christian ought to have to come to terms with Rauschenbusch's thought because it is the deepest and best American expression of the Social Gospel, characteristically American yet deeply rooted in the Bible and in continental theology and social thought.

In a very real way, of course, Rauschenbusch is dated and superseded both in understanding of the prophets, apocalypticists and the New Testament, and in socialist thought. But this is true of all save the very greatest of men. Those who have succeeded and superseded Rauschenbusch often gladly acknowledge that they bear the marks of the man's spirit and work. From him stemmed two great tides of social thought in the Christian churches. One was destined to lose most of its Christian doctrine and life and become immersed in the secularism of the world it sought to perfect. The other, driven by the tension between the Bible and a disintegrating world, emerged as the profoundest modern school of theology. There is no question that the latter is the true line of descent from Rauschenbusch. Yet both the other tradition and social thought marked by Rauschenbusch outside of the Christian tradition has much that is great and valuable.

Many men of the reviewer's generation knew Rauschenbusch only as a name affixed to great books which stirred them deeply in Seminary days and beyond. They were grateful to the man who opened to them lost ways to their Bible and disclosed the Kingdom of God to them in a way closer to its original meaning. These men are grateful to Dr. Sharpe for clothing the name with the flesh and blood of a man from whom they can still learn much.

Rauschenbusch had the courage not only to side with victims of social injustice but also to preach to them the severity of the Gospel in relevant terms. "When I am asked to speak anywhere," he said, "I always ask myself, 'What is there that these people ought to hear that they would least like to hear,' and then speak on that" (p. 203). Nothing illustrates this fearlessness better than his address, *Dogmatic and Practical Socialism*, delivered "to an audience made up almost wholly of socialist working men." The religious criticism of their dogmatism, the sociological criticism of their neglect of the land question and of the growth of the great middle class, and the historiographical criticism of Marx's theory of surplus value as the key to the interpretation of history are as valid today as they were in 1901.

Incidentally in this address we glimpse what must have been a fine strain of humor in the man when he compares the surplus value theory to "a patent medicine that under-

takes to regulate your liver and also promote the growth of your whiskers, strengthen your heart action and cause all warts to disappear."

It is good, also, to have the extracts from his Cleveland Y.M.C.A. address in 1913, with one of which we close:

Here was something so big that absolutely nothing that interested me was excluded from it. Was it a matter of personal religion? Why the Kingdom of God begins with that! The powers of the Kingdom of God well up in the individual soul; that is where they are born and that is where the starting point must necessarily be. Was it a matter of world-wide missions? Why that is the Kingdom of God, isn't it—carrying it out to the boundaries of the earth. Was it a matter of getting justice to the working man? Is not justice part of the Kingdom of God? Does not the Kingdom of God consist in this—that God's will shall be done on earth, even as it is done in heaven? And so, wherever I touched, there was the Kingdom of God. That was the brilliance, the splendor of that conception—it touches everything with religion. It carries God into everything that you do, and there is nothing else that does it in the same way (p. 222).

A. T. MOLLEGEN,

Virginia Theological Seminary

William Lawrence: Later Years of a Happy Life. By Henry Knox Sherrill. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, pp. xii + 179. \$2.00.

This book is a delight to those who, like the reviewer, knew and revered Bishop Lawrence but were able to see very little of him in his later years. We were acquainted with his career till he resigned his jurisdiction and what manner of man he was then. We are grateful for learning the rest of the story, and for seeing how gloriously he finished his course. The effectiveness of the Church is in its leadership and Bishop Lawrence was one of our great liberal leaders. The Church's power is shown in the characters it produces and in the influence it exerts through them on the community. Bishop Lawrence was a great Christian gentleman, the finished product of the finest New England tradition, and his career shows how the Church affects the world.

The author's aim is to complete the story of Bishop Lawrence's life from the point when the autobiographical *Memoirs of a Happy Life* ended; to show how the last fourteen and a half years, supposedly "years of retirement," were filled with happiness and fruitful service; to make available the bishop's mature wisdom. His method is topical. So far as possible the story is told in the Bishop's own words, by quoting extensively from his diary, addresses and letters.

The book is valuable because it fulfils the author's aim. Bishop Sherrill has shown excellent judgment in his quotations, giving us an admirable insight into Bishop Lawrence's views on most of the important matters of the day. It is inspiring to learn the secret of a serene, happy life, based on a very simple and uncomplicated faith—a faith too simple for some but inspiring for all because of its reality—whose motto was "Praise the Lord, O my soul," and whose content was trust in a Heavenly Father understood through the man Jesus. The few judgments Bishop Sherrill permits himself are sound.

ALEXANDER C. ZABRISKIE

Virginia Theological Seminary

Poetry and Life: An Anthology of English Catholic Poetry. Compiled by F. J. Sheed. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. xviii + 187. \$2.50.

"This book," says the compiler, "contains poems written in English by [Roman] Catholics from earliest times to the end of the nineteenth century." Its purpose is not

primarily to select the best Catholic poems of English literature, but to enable the reader "to see what man's life has looked like to the Catholic poets." Hence the material is classified under various topical headings pertaining to the Catholic faith in itself and in relation to man's existence in God's world.

Mr. Sheed has not been governed exclusively by considerations of content. He provides a helpful introduction on the reading of poetry and he has tried, in the main successfully, to select material of aesthetic as well as of religious value. But his basically didactic intention has made him include some selections which are more instructive than poetic and has confined him to a rather small group of poets who will not always appeal to the not very sophisticated reader for whom he has compiled this volume. Anglo-Saxon and Middle English poetry are drawn on heavily, of course in modernized versions; twelve selections from *Piers Plowman* are scattered through the book. Cynewulf and Langland are certainly rich in Catholic doctrine, but in modern English dress they hardly satisfy the Wordsworthian standard of "truth carried alive into the heart by passion."

Too many poems, such as *The Hound of Heaven* and Crashaw's *Hymn to Saint Teresa*, are printed with substantial omissions. Along with some beautiful examples of the Catholic way of regarding the world and the life of man one finds several selections which are not distinctively Catholic. This is especially true of the section entitled "The Beauty of the World." The anonymous author of *Sumer is icumen in* must obviously have been a Catholic, but the same feelings might have been experienced by a Methodist or a Taoist. And what does Chaucer's *To Rosemound* tell us about Catholicism? But although this anthology is a far from satisfying revelation of the treasures of English Catholic verse, it may serve to convince some children of the Church that their religion is a great source of poetic feeling and poetic utterance.

HOXIE N. FAIRCHILD.

Hunter College

Christianity and the Family. By Ernest R. Groves. New York: Macmillan, 1942, pp. viii + 229. \$2.00.

The Meaning of Marriage and the Foundations of the Family. By Sidney E. Goldstein. New York: Bloch, 1942, pp. x + 214. \$1.00.

The above books will be welcomed by all students of the family, and both are valuable for the parish priest. Dr. Groves' book is divided into two large sections, the first dealing with the family as the ally of Christianity. He shows that an understanding of the family is necessary for an understanding of the teachings of Jesus and the conception of the Church. The family is likewise not only a "sphere of life where Christian motives are expressed, but a nurturing fellowship which brings forth impulses that can be spiritualized and made the substance of Christian experience." "It is this preparatory functioning of the family that makes the home of such great importance to the Church and the minister." But also "the family offers the Christian an area of responsibility where he can first test the sincerity and concreteness of his principles and aspirations." The family is thus an indispensable ally of the Church in the formation of character.

The second section is a careful statement of the work and help that can and should be given by the Church to the family. This section contains valuable advice on the Church's program of education for family life, the minister's role as domestic counselor, with the art and hazard of that activity. This is certainly a book to be recommended, for it will reveal to many the necessity for a great concern on the part of

the Church for the problems of family life as well as specific advice on how to implement that concern. A bibliography is added.

Rabbi Goldstein's book, a real "buy" for a dollar, is written with a threefold purpose expressed by him in the foreword. (1) He wants to introduce people to the treasure house of Jewish experience, its laws, ideals and development. This is done from the liberal point of view with copious references to both ancient and modern Judaism. (2) He wants to acquaint the reader with the "vast amount of new material on marriage and the family that is now being assembled in the laboratories of the social sciences and is now being made available to larger and larger circles of the population." (3) He wants to urge people to prepare adequately for marriage and to seek expert guidance and counsel. It is the combination of the deeply religious view of marriage, sound sociological knowledge, and practical advice which has made this book so popular (this is the second edition, revised and enlarged by several chapters).

RICHARD S. EMBICH.

Episcopal Theological School

Old Principles and New Order. By Vincent McNabb, O.P. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. xvi + 246. \$2.75.

Father McNabb, well known to visitors to Hyde Park in London as one of the frequent Roman Catholic speakers, and greatly beloved for his ministry of devoted service to the poor of London, has long been a leader in the Catholic Land Movement in England. He has now collected in one cover a large number of brief essays and short articles, which express his convinced advocacy of a large scale Roman Catholic movement from the cities to the country. Although he insists that he is a believer, not in the primitive but in the primary, he clearly appears in these pages as an unqualified adherent of the doctrine that small scale farming, the closer to self-subsistence the better, is the best way for men, women and children to live. The city, or even the town, he cannot away with, and agriculture for the market is to him practically as bad. Many of the essays and articles present his cause in a very winning manner, but some of his economics seem thoroughly naïve. He makes use of the New Testament to serve his end, but his presentation of the story of the Gadarene swine, as proving the harm of large scale agriculture, is anything but convincing.

As is inevitable in such a book of collected writings, there is a great deal of repetition, but the reader closes the volume with a profound respect and liking for its author. The book includes a beautiful meditation on John 17, "For Them," which has nothing to do with the rest of the book, but alone would justify the publication of the volume.

Students of monasticism will be particularly interested in an essay which blames the decline of the Cistercian monasteries in England on their going into agriculture for the market.

N. B. NASH.

St. Paul's School

A Companion to the Summa. Vol. IV, The Way of Life. By Walter Farrell, O.P. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. viii + 464. \$3.75.

This volume completes Fr. Farrell's summary of the *Summa Theologica*. It contains St. Thomas' treatment of Our Lord, Our Lady, the Sacraments and the Last Things. As in the other volumes, there is no concession to modern "prejudice." Even the opinion that the blessed in heaven rejoice in contemplating the punishments of

the damned is upheld, and we are assured that "it is of faith that these punishments are eternal and without mitigation." The attempt to present Thomistic theology in up-to-the-minute idiom sometimes results in passages of questionable taste. Surely one need not be accused of absurd over-sensitiveness if one is shocked by a sentence such as this, concerning Our Lord's presence in the Blessed Sacrament: "... the body of Christ is there . . . not by pushing the substance of bread into a little smaller space, like a last-minute customer edging his way into a seat on a crowded subway."

In the section on the Immaculate Conception the author seems disingenuous. We are left with the impression that quite possibly St. Thomas did uphold the doctrine, or, if he did not, it was a momentary lapse, a "single mistake," without lasting effect on the history of theology. No such impression could be created by an accurate presentation of the facts. St. Thomas did not believe in the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and his view was defended for centuries. At least as late as the 17th century the Dominicans were permitted, by Papal Bull, to defend this opinion of St. Thomas and their opponents were forbidden to accuse them of heresy for such defense.

There is, of course, much that is of interest in this volume, as in the others. As a popular manual to introduce modern readers to the Angelic Doctor it has real value.

W. F. WHITMAN.

Nashotah House

The Servant of the Word. By Herbert H. Farmer. New York: Scribners, 1942, pp. vii + 152. \$1.50.

This splendid little book is primarily for preachers, but it is as good for listeners. It is also an excellent and simple exposition of neo-evangelical theology.

Dr. Farmer explains that Barth in theology and Dodd in New Testament scholarship are signs of a general rediscovery of preaching as the unique vehicle of the Gospel. Christianity created Christian preaching, which differs from all other forms of religious address because God "never enters into *personal* relationships with a man apart from other human persons" (p. 37). The Christian preacher, therefore, seeks an I-thou encounter which God may use for His personal encounter with both preacher and hearer. This means that a self-conscious, self-directing will must seek to condition another will in such a way as to leave that other free. Preaching is a direct and personal claim upon the hearer to share meaning with him, and the claim should be presented inescapably.

The author makes appreciative use of Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner and Buber. Preaching today must be deeply aware of "the failure of nerve" of our civilization which is partially masked and partially satisfied by the war effort. It must know the individual's sense of personal insignificance and of the abyss beneath all human existence out of which arise the dark forces in himself and his world. The children of our time seek, therefore, for an absolute ground to give meaning, security and moral guidance to their lives. Only the Gospel can meet this situation, it is true. But it does not necessarily meet it by saying that it does. Nor are evangelistic methods of a past time effective today. The gospel must speak relevantly to men in social crisis and its message must be heard in and through discussion of social integration.

Much of the book is given to specific and practical consideration of preaching. Dr. Farmer's advice is always consonant with his theology, preaching must be ordered by the personal principles of the Gospel which it bears. He is best, perhaps, when he wrestles humbly and in an illumining way with the hearers' evasiveness. He is concerned that neither liturgy nor preaching assist the hearers' attempts to evade

the personal encounter. Among other things he points to the dilemma of Biblical preaching. Preaching the Bible may too easily aid evasion of God through preoccupation with the past. The prophets of God, the Incarnate Lord, the sinners were ancient and oriental and the preacher and hearers are tempted to adopt the rôle of observers not personally concerned.

A. T. MOLLEGEN.

Virginia Theological Seminary

Motives for Christian Living. By William P. King. New York: Harpers, 1942, pp. viii + 188. \$1.50.

This is a popular and able book on Christian Ethics and is especially suited for intelligent laymen. The treatment of the subject is divided into two sections: (1) The Ethical Ideals of Christianity, and (2) The Motive Power for the Good Life. In the first section Mr. King lays a fine stress upon the truth that growth in the Christian life is a growth in relationships with man and God. The summary of the Law is analyzed, and the great sins that separate man from God are described.

In the second section the motives of the good life are set forth. These are true self-love, the love of others, gratitude to Christ, fellowship with a loving Father, and the recognition of the abiding consequences of our choices. He is strong in his contention that naturalism cuts the nerve of high living. All of the book is clear, well written, and filled with homiletical illustrations. There is a refreshing stress laid upon the fact that Christian ethics are not conventional ethics. The book has the usual virtues and defects which are associated with popular writing. No student of Christian Ethics will do much more than glance at the book, but this reviewer hopes that many laity in our parishes will have the pleasure and the profit of reading it.

RICHARD S. EMRICH.

Episcopal Theological School

Philosophy and Order. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XVII. Ed. by Charles A. Hart. Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1942, pp. iv + 204. \$2.00.

By now, most of us must be aware that there is something desperately wrong with Western civilization. The chaotic disorder that has long seemed to be the most readily observable characteristic of social aggregates of the Western world is now found in the destructive, world shaking war. This disorder is a fact that can no longer escape the attention of any man. Is there order in the cosmos? If so and if disorder is the most obvious characteristic of Western cultures, what then is order? What would an ordered society be like? Is order indigenous to the structure of the cosmos, or does man effect order by his efforts? Or both?

These are some of the questions considered by the group of scholars who prepared this collection of papers for the 1941 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. The asking of them and the attempt to answer in the light of our present predicament is not original with the Association. Yet, it is refreshing to have in hand considerations of the problem of order by conscientious, serious minded scholars, representing a substantial portion of Christendom and the *philosophia perennis* as the Roman Catholic Church has received the same.

Our chief criticism of these essays is, to put it briefly, a criticism of this philosophy as a whole. We may take as an example the able paper in which Fr. Ward of the University of Notre Dame poses the problem and offers a tentative definition of order.

He disclaims any attempt to solve the problem of whether there is an order in nature, being satisfied with the permanent status of order as a philosophical problem. In making such a statement Fr. Ward apparently accepts the fact of order within the cosmos, and legitimately so, one might judge. I doubt if anyone who has seriously considered the persistent problems of philosophy denies the presence of some order in the cosmos. Those who exclusively attended to that aspect of reality which is designated the *social*, and being impressed by the seeming chaos there, might be inclined, on the basis of their limited range of vision, to deny the fact of order. Certainly, within the spheres of the physical, the strictly biological, and the psychological, a measure of order has been discovered or more properly, described and understood. Where mystery persists within these selected aspects of reality, the conclusion is not that chaos reigns therein, but rather that all the evidence that would clear away the mists is not yet in. Our observation of phenomena has been faulty or limited and curtailed, or our hypothetical constructions are not such as to comprehend and make for an understanding of that which has been observed, and to an extent described.

It is to be regretted that Fr. Ward at times poses order and disorder as contradictions, with a tendency to define disorder as that which is lacking in order, leaving the reader to view order as that which is not chaotic. Charles Sanders Peirce has pointed out that there is always a kind of order even where there seems to be chaos. It is for man to describe and understand that order rather than impatiently to brand the particular complex being considered as chaotic. If this is a tenable position in respect to the problem of order, then it is senseless to pose order and disorder as contradictions. Indeed to define order and disorder in this fashion is to indulge in a specialized kind of circular definition. It would seem better to critically and tentatively consider order as an omnipresent characteristic of reality to be defined in terms of observable and describable uniformities.

In some of the other papers, Fr. Wellmuth of Loyola University, Chicago, endeavors to clarify the relationship between modern logic and scholastic philosophy; Elizabeth Salmon deals with psychology—and here the hiatus between the attempted rigid empiricism of the scientific disciplines and the essentially uncritical rationalism of Thomistic philosophy and theology becomes quite apparent; Fr. Wilfrid Parsons presents a refinement of Jacques Maritain's finely balanced philosophy of the State; and Fr. Haas offers a brief definition of the term "order." Msgr. Sheen's presidential address, "Man, the Image of God," is reproduced in outline form.

The most appealing paper in this collection is the Annual Association Address presented by much-chastened Walter Lippmann. He argues that the crisis in Western civilization is due in no small measure to the disorder present in the lives of the individuals that constitute Society. Men have subordinated reason to the demands of desire rather than make reason the orderer of desire. The result has been an insatiable greed on the parts of individuals and social groups, which has created social disorder and brought Western civilization to the brink of disaster.

Mr. Lippmann makes an impassioned appeal for the reestablishment of the controls indicated by the classical view of man, as the philosophy of which it is a part is at the foundation of Western civilization.

It is well to note that modern science and philosophy have dominated Western culture for several centuries, now, thereby creating a situation which the inner controls, indicated by classical philosophy, cannot handle. Men must order their lives in accordance with the situation in which they find themselves. The importation of prin-

ciple of order from the past will not do, in all probability. These controls must be indigenous to the society and culture to be ordered.

This collection of papers constitutes an able presentation of the Roman Catholic attitude to the social crisis of our day, but an uncritical rationalism, which Thomism is, decked out in trappings provided by modern scientific thought, cannot bring order out of chaos.

DONALD B. ROBINSON,

Columbus, Nebraska

Religious Crossroads. By Radoslav A. Tsanoff. New York: Dutton, 1942, pp. xiv + 384. \$3.75.

The author of this book, Professor of Philosophy at the Rice Institute, Houston, Texas, was born in Bulgaria but has studied and taught in this country for many years. The purpose of the book, as stated in the preface, is "to deal critically but also constructively with problems which religious experience presents to reflective thought." But Prof. Tsanoff knows that the problems of religion cannot be understood on the basis of external inspection alone. "He who would probe religion to the heart," he says, "must himself be in search of a heart and center of spiritual values."

The first part of the book is a study of the history of religion, leading from primitive religion through Hebrew monotheism to the Christian doctrine of God. The discussion of the existence of God, God's attributes, and the Atonement proceed along traditional lines, though approaching the traditional problems of theology from a philosopher's rather than a theologian's point of view as he does, he makes use of a considerable amount of fresh material by way of argument and illustration. The chapter on mysticism shows a real sympathy with the point of view of the mystics, and a real understanding of catholic teaching on the subject.

Prof. Tsanoff's philosophical position is close to that of personalism, which has played an important part in Protestant theology in the last forty years. His emphasis on the objectivity of value is characteristic of this point of view. The difference between good and evil, he holds, is not intrinsic but "directional." The goodness or badness of any given value depends upon its position in a scale of values. He rejects the idea of God as absolute. The struggle between good and evil is a real struggle, and goes to the heart of things. God's power is to be regarded as actually limited, but this does not belittle God. If it seems to do so it is evidence of a confusion between "value categories" and "factual-existential categories."

Criticism of this position would involve considerations for which there is not space in this review. It is hard to see, however, how one can maintain this point of view without doing violence to some very fundamental elements in religious experience. Whether one agrees with it or not, the book presents a clear and thoroughly documented statement of a position that is important in present day philosophy of religion.

C. L. STREET.

Christ Church, Dallas, Tex.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Christianity and Civilisation. By H. G. Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1942. \$1.25.

The latest volume in the little series entitled "Current Problems," edited by Ernest Barker, is a very able discussion of the relation between Christianity and civilization. The fundamental bases of our civilization are Liberty, Justice, Mercy, and Truth. These are the principles which now stand in jeopardy every hour, since they have been renounced by the leaders of the Axis countries. Although Jesus did not come to save civilization, but rather to save men and women (p. 17), nevertheless it is true that Christianity, rather than scientific Humanism, or Marxianism, is the real parent and guardian of these highest human principles of living.

The book contains an extremely interesting discussion of a Christian coöperative commonwealth; the author does not go as far as Malvern or as Sir Richard Acland, but he certainly goes a longer way than many of our present-day economic planners. Chapter five deals with the international order and takes a very sane viewpoint. A state or nation cannot adopt pacifism unless it is willing to be a martyr-nation. Pacifism may be respected in the private conscience; to expect it in the behavior of a nation is to look for suicide.

The final chapter, "Good Friday 1942," sums up the book in the form of a sermon. On the whole this is a most stimulating and readable presentation of the importance of Christianity for the survival of civilization.

F. C. G.

Representative Medieval and Tudor Plays. Translated and modernized by Roger Sherman Loomis and Henry W. Wells. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942, pp. iv + 301. \$3.50.

The collection merits its title, for the ten plays which, with an introduction and valuable bibliography, make up the book, are varied in type, time and cycle or derivation. The introduction provides an excellent brief study of medieval drama and the selection of plays illustrates admirably the survey which the introduction affords. In describing the rise of the drama of the middle ages, it notes the part of the Church and its calendar in liturgical drama; the fact that the composing and acting of the plays was by amateurs, for the most part; and the circumstance that the universal urge to play-acting finds expression in the adaptation to its ends of "pre-existing narratives." Thus, the liturgical or scriptural narrative produced the mystery; the saint's legend, the miracle; the fabliau, the farce; moral allegory, the morality play. In content and commentary, in format and illustration, this book holds interest and deserves applause. It should give the general reader a happy sense of having been an onlooker as an old story was re-enacted on the pageant platform of a medieval market place.

J. H. J.

Pascal's Apology for Religion. Extracted from the *Pensées* by H. F. Stewart. Cambridge University Press, 1942, pp. xxiv + 231. \$2.00.

The proper editing and rearrangement of Pascal's *Pensées* is a famous literary problem with a history of its own. Dr. Stewart, with the help of various editions and

Brunschvicg's facsimile, has attempted afresh a reconstruction of the famous lecture delivered by Pascal at Port Royal some time in 1657-9, of which we have an account by Filleau de la Chaise. No suturing has been employed; the rearranged fragments, in the French text, are left to speak for themselves, though a helpful preface and conjectural syllabus are prefixed.

The result is a book which should be helpful to theologians and philosophers. It appears at a time when many of Pascal's points of view are expressed in different forms by the neo-orthodox theologians, but almost never with such clarity and brilliance. Though the approach to the Bible is pre-critical, much of what Pascal says about the uniqueness of Hebrew-Christian history and the revelation in Christ, is fresh and convincing. One of the makers of modern science, he speaks to the scientific mind; a saint, he knows first-hand what faith and grace mean; and he deserves never to be forgotten. We are grateful to Dr. Stewart for a labor of love well done.

S. E. J.

The Healing of the Waters. By Amos N. Wilder. New York: Harpers, 1943, pp. xii + 89. \$1.75.

Dr. Wilder, who is not only a gifted poet but also professor of New Testament at Andover-Newton, comes from a distinguished family and adds lustre to it. This volume contains a number of poems previously published in his *Battle-Retrospect* (1923) and *Arachne: Poems* (1928), and to them are added a number of his more recent compositions. Many of these show to a high degree the beauty of form and sharply lapidary and compact phraseology which are characteristic of modern poetry. Add to this the rich background derived from knowledge of classical and Italian poetry, the Bible in the original languages, and Christian theology, together with a sensitiveness to the modern scene, and one has an idea of the riches to be found here. The book's title is taken from the first poem, "The City of Destruction," which portrays Paris in 1939 with an intensity and penetration reminiscent of T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*.

S. E. J.

Dr. Rudolf Bolling Teusler: An Adventure in Christianity. By Howard Chandler Robbins and George K. MacNaught. New York: Scribners, 1942, pp. xvi + 221. \$2.00.

Dr. Barnardo and his Homes are indelibly hyphenated in the mind, as are the names of the late Doctors Mayo with their Rochester Clinics. So also, and in greater measure, is the name of Dr. Rudolf Bolling Teusler and St. Luke's International Medical Center in Tokyo, Japan. For the first thirty-four years of this century Dr. Teusler gave himself to this project, commencing with a building little better than a shack. On the day he died, August 10, 1934, the International Medical Center occupied a square block in the heart of Tokyo, easily the outstanding hospital of the Orient. Undeterred by the complete devastation of the buildings in the earthquake of 1923 Dr. Teusler heroically set about raising the funds for a new and greater 'witness to Christ in the Orient.' Doubtless he was the greatest missionary doctor of our day in the East, and the results of his life and witness among the people of Japan may yet prove stronger in healing the wounds of war than the declarations and deliberations of the world's secular statesmen.

J. S. H.

Second Sowing: The Life of Mary Aloysia Hardey. By Margaret Williams. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942, pp. x + 495. \$3.50.

It was Mother Duchesne who made the "first sowing" of the Society of the Sacred Heart in America, and one of her first American Novices was the future Mother Hardey, whose work has been compared with that of St. Teresa in her arduous journeys and her many foundations. This record of her life is more than a mere biography; the period (1809-1886) is an interesting one not only in the growth of the Society and the progress of the Roman Catholic Church in this country, but in the history of American thought and education as well, and for all these the book is a mine of historical information. The frame of Mother Hardey's life was the America of her day, though there is a distinctly French background for the portrait.

Conventional biography easily tends to become conventional hagiography, with a somewhat routine pattern of youthful pieties and ready miracles. Here we have a different approach. We see a delightfully wholesome, intelligent child growing into a charming and thoughtful young woman, the development of religious vocation of a high order, and its fulfilment in a long life of spiritual and practical activity. Instead of the usual signs and wonders, our attention is held by that gentle but powerful miracle—a pure and holy life of unswerving loyalty and steadfast endeavor.

S. V. M.

Which Way Ahead? By Walter Russell Bowie. New York: Harpers, 1943, pp. xiv + 145. \$1.50.

This is the Presiding Bishop's Book for Lent and, like everything that comes from its author's pen, is exceedingly well planned and written. In the first chapter he sets down in definite unmistakable language the Church's needs, and whether one would agree that these are the only needs or the supreme needs, one must grant that those thus listed stand high in any similar grouping. In the remaining chapters he points out both the handicaps and the advantages which the Church possesses in attempting to meet these needs of the hour. The book is stimulating and readers cannot read it carefully without being compelled to face their individual responsibility as members of the Church.

F. A. M.

Sources of Courage. By Joseph H. Lookstein. New York: Bloch, 1943, pp. 25.

Brief wartime sermons, pointed and practical, models in method and spirit.

F. A. M.

A NOTE FROM DR. COFFIN

Editor of the *ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*,
Dear Sir:

May I venture to call attention to a misrepresentation of the Presbyterian point of view in Canon Wedel's admirable and cogent article in your last issue? Canon Wedel accuses Presbyterians of lack of a sense of *continuity* in our conception of the Church. He quotes a definition of the Church from the Confession of Faith, but unhappily he quotes the definition of the *visible* Church. Obviously the visible Church is the contemporary Church. Had he quoted the previous section in the same chapter, he would have read this definition of the Church:

"The catholic or universal church, which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that *have been, are or shall be*, gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof."

How could *continuity* be more explicitly stated?

In this connection it is well to recall that in the disputes over Church government in the Seventeenth Century, the Independents accused the Presbyterians of being foolishly concerned over the continuity of their ministry with the past. Why should the ministry of the Pre-reformation Church be regarded? Yet Presbyterians would have no ministry which was not ordained by those already ministers. Oliver Cromwell laughed at them as having "a ministry deriving itself from the Papacy, and pretending to that which is so much insisted upon—succession." In the *Form of Church Government*, adopted in 1645, it is said:

"Christ hath instituted a government and governors ecclesiastical in the Church: to that purpose the apostles did immediately receive the keys from the hands of Jesus Christ . . . and Christ hath since *continually* furnished some in His Church with gifts of government and commission to execute the same when called thereunto."

The opponents of the Presbyterian tradition with its emphasis upon continuity kept repeating the charge that this made their ministry derive from the Papal Church. A polemical work of 1654, entitled *Jus Divinum Ministerii Evangelici*, replies on the Presbyterian side:

"The receiving of our ordination from Christ and His apostles and the primitive churches, and so all along through the Church of Rome, is so far from nullifying our ministry or disparaging it, that it is a great strengthening of it, when it shall appear to all the world that our ministry is derived from Christ and His apostles by succession of a ministry continued for 1600 years, and that we have a lineal succession from Christ and His apostles."

This succession is not transmitted by the imposition of hands only—indeed this ceremony was omitted for a few years in the troubled days immediately following the first carrying out of the Reformation in Scotland, although it was resumed within the generation, and has since been continued. Nor has it been transmitted through the monepiscopate, for in the Presbyterian tradition the New Testament is regarded as teaching that bishop and presbyter were one office. But it is officially transmitted through the Presbytery composed of at least three presbyter-bishops. The point is that *continuity* is not without its emphasis in our system.

The latest official documents of the Church of Scotland, those drawn up in connection with the Reunion which took place in 1929, clearly evidence the same care for continuity with the Church of the past. In the Articles of the Church of Scotland which preceded the union, it is said:

"The Church of Scotland is part of the Holy Catholic or Universal Church. . . . This Church is in historical continuity with the Church which was reformed in 1560."

Let me express my admiration for Canon Wedel's discussion of the subject of organic union between the Protestant Episcopal Church and our own, at the same time that I humbly suggest that he has hardly done justice to this one point in our Presbyterian tradition.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY SLOANE COFFIN.

Union Theological Seminary

